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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS ON TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND HEALTH
My dissertation consists of three essays on trade, environment and health. The first
essay empirically evaluates domestic facilities’ environmental response to Chinese
import competition in the United States (US) manufacturing sector from 2000 to
2010. Using facility-level data on chemical emissions and employing an instrumental
variables approach, the paper finds that industry/regional exposure to increased
import competition had very little impact on the environmental decisions of domestic
facilities.
The second essay empirically explores a possible link between the environmen-
tal justice efforts during the Obama administration and the change in environmental
inequity by examining the change in US facilities’ underlying environmental behavior,
focusing on the period at the beginning of Obama administration (2009) and towards
the end of the administration (2016). I find that even though environmental inequity
existed in both years, there is evidence of reduction in environmental inequity from
2009 to 2016. Specifically, facilities seem to make cleaner environmental decisions with
respect to their share of emissions released/recycled, source reduction activities, and
exit/entry in high-minority, low-income counties during this period.
The third essay investigates whether ambulance quality, measured by patient
transportation time, varies by organization type. Using data from the National EMS
Information System (NEMSIS) for the years 2010-2015, the paper finds that, on
average, ambulance services owned by fire departments respond faster than those
managed by other types of ownership. Specifically, fire-department-owned medical
emergency services located in urban areas are approximately 17 percent or six minutes
faster than those owned by community nonprofit organizations, and are around four
to five minutes faster than those owned by other organizations.
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Ambulance Ownership.
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Chapter 1 Toxic Release Inventory Data
1.1 Introduction
In chapters 2 and 3, I use the publicly available environmental data at the
facility level that comes from the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Toxic
Release Inventory (hereafter TRI) program.1 In this chapter, I provide a detailed
description of the data.
The TRI is a mandatory reporting program that was established by the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) in 1986, which
required facilities to report their hazardous emissions to federal, state, and local
government. The Act was passed by Congress in response to large chemical releases
by a company, Union Carbide, that caused over two thousand deaths in Bhopal,
India overnight in 1984 and, in 1985, various respiratory issues and hospitalizations in
Institute, West Virginia.2 For this analysis, we accessed data from the TRI reporting
program from 2000 to 2010. These data provide the amounts (in pounds) of emissions
from various industrial activities of each reporting facility for each chemical in each
year. It also gives various facility characteristics such as name, physical location, and
NAICS 6-digit industry code.
A facility must report to the TRI if it meets three criteria: (1) the facility
either belongs to a TRI-regulated industry, determined by the 6-digit NAICS code,3 or
is federally owned or operated, (2) the facility employs 10 or more full-time employees,
and (3) the facility manufactures, processes, or otherwise uses4 a TRI-listed chemical
that exceeds the TRI reporting threshold for that chemical in a particular year. If a
facility meets all three criteria, then it must report to the TRI, where the environmental
activity for each individual chemical is reported separately.5
1Data can be downloaded from EPA’s website https://www.epa.gov/
toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/tri-data-and-tools.
2For more information, refer to https://www.I.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/
learn-about-toxics-release-inventory.
3Information on TRI-covered industries is available at https://www.epa.gov/
toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/tri-covered-industry-sectors.
4For definitions of Manufacture, Process, and Otherwise use, see Environmental Protection
Agency (USEPA, 2015).
5Every year, all the US facilities that meet the TRI criteria are required to re-
port their data to EPA by July 1.For more information, see https://www.epa.gov/
toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/tri-compliance-and-enforcement.
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In the succeeding chapters, the interest lies in the data related to the waste
management of chemicals. Specifically, the focus is on whether the facility has
undertaken source reduction activities, and the amounts of recycling and releases
(including disposal) that a facility has generated. Source reduction refers to the
process of reducing the production of chemical waste at the source rather than dealing
with management of waste after it is generated. It aims to reduce the amount of
hazardous substances or pollutants going into the waste stream (or being released) and
to minimize the hazard to public health and the environment (USEPA, 2015). The
eight broad categories of source reduction activities include activities ranging from
minor practices such as cleaning and degreasing (for example, changing to aqueous
cleaners from solvents such as chloroethylene (TCE) (USEPA, 2017)) to more intensive
practices like process modifications (for instance, modifying equipment, layout, or
piping to reduce the toxic chemical needed for the process).6
Recycling generally refers to the recovery of a toxic chemical or hazardous
waste for reuse.7 For instance, (USEPA, 1999) considers a facility’s extraction of
chromium from sludge during wastewater treatment and selling of it for reuse as
recycling. Releases refer to the amount of each chemical emitted into the environment
or disposed of through the medium of air, land, water, or underground injection
(USEPA, 2015).
The total quantity recycled or released is reported in pounds and broken
down by whether the material is processed on- or off- site. Total emissions quantity
is obtained by summing the amounts of chemicals that are recycled, combusted for
energy recovery, treated, and released (also separated by on- and off-site).8 Figure 1.1
refers to the hierarchy of waste management provided by the Pollution Prevention
Act of 19909 (USEPA, 2015). Source reduction is the most preferred method of waste
management. It is aimed at getting rid of the chemical waste at its source thereby
avoiding generation of waste.10 If the waste is generated, the most preferred method
6The data appendix contains additional information on source reduction activities.
7For more formal definition of recycling, reader is referred
to https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/
interpretations-waste-management-activities-recycling.
8The reader is referred to the data appendix for further information related to recycling and
release of chemical emissions, such as which fields in the TRI data and which sections of the submitted
form provides the data on recycling/release.
9Facilities are required to report their waste management activities by The Pollution Prevention
Act of 1990 and since 1991, facilities are required to report any source reduction activities implemented
(USEPA, 2015).
10According to USEPA (2009), total production-related waste generated and managed by TRI
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to tackle it is recycling, followed by energy recovery, treatment, and release (USEPA,
2009).
Some facilities can submit Form A11, which is a shorter form, instead of
Form R. For the chemicals for which these facilities are eligible to submit this form,
it is required that the chemical is not a PBT chemical, has not been manufactured,
processed, or otherwise used in amounts greater than 1,000,000 lbs., and its total
annual waste management including recycling, energy recovery, treatment, and disposal
or other releases is not greater than 500 lbs.12
The main sources of the environmental data used in the following chapters
are TRI Basic data files and TRI 2a Basic plus data files, both of which contain
the data elements from the forms that the facilities submit to the EPA. Whereas
TRI basic data file contains mostly quantitative data, TRI 2a Basic plus data files
also contains non-quantitative data on waste management. These files are merged by
facility-chemical- NAICS 6-digit industry pair.
The data on source reduction activities are obtained from TRI 2a basic plus
dataset. Section 8.10 of Form R contains this information. Pollution Prevention Act
of 1990 defines source reduction as “any practice that:
1) Reduces the amount of any hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant
entering any waste stream or otherwise release into the environment (including fugitive
emissions) prior to recycling, treatment or disposal; and
2) Reduces the hazards to public health and the environment associated with
the release of such substances, pollutants or contaminants.” (USEPA, 2015)
Below are the source reduction activity codes (USEPA, 2016):
Good operating practices: W13, W14, W15, W19
Inventory control: W21, W22, W23, W24, W25, W29
Spill and leak prevention: W31, W32, W33, W35, W36, W39
Raw material modifications: W41, W42, W43, W49
Process modifications: W50, W51, W52, W53, W54, W55, W56, W57, W58
Cleaning and degreasing: W59, W60, W63, W64, W65, W66, W67, W68,
W71
Surface preparation and finishing: W72, W73, W74, W75, W78
facilities reduced by 26% from 2001 to 2009.
11Form A has only facility and chemical identification information
12For more information, see https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/
basics-tri-reporting
3
Product modifications: W81, W81, W82, W83, W84, W89
1.2 Variable Construction
The variables are constructed as follows:
1) Percentage of emissions disposed or otherwise released (both on-site and
off-site included) in year t is given by:
Released ptt =
Emissions Released in year t
Total Emissions in year t
(1.2.1)
where Total Emissions= Emissions Recycled+ Emissions Recovered+ Emissions
Treated+ Emissions Released. The data for amount of emissions released (chem-
ical disposed or otherwise released) is obtained from summation of fields 94, 95, 96,
and 97 for year t (if t is greater than or equal to 2003) and from field 93 if t is less
than 2003, in the TRI basic dataset.
2) Percentage of emissions recycled (both on-site and off-site included) in
year t is given by:
Recycled ptt =
Emissions Recycled in year t
Total Emissions in year t
(1.2.2)
where Total Emissions= Emissions Recycled+ Emissions Recovered+ Emissions
Treated+ Emissions Released. The value for amount of emissions recycled comes from
summation of fields 100 and 101 for year t in TRI basic dataset.
3) Whether or not a facility adopts a source reduction activity in year t. It
is calculated as:Dummy for whether the facility had adopted any source reduction
activity in year t (1 if any source reduction activity conducted, 0 otherwise). The
information about source reduction activities is provided in the basic 2a plus dataset
(fields 93, 101, 109, and 117).
4) Number of source reduction activities implemented in t: This the total
number of source reduction activities implemented by a facility in year t. The
information about source reduction activities is provided in the basic 2a plus dataset
(fields 93, 101, 109, and 117).
5) Percentage change in total emissions, which is the sum of amount of
chemical recycled, combusted for energy recovery, treated, and disposed or otherwise
released (both on-site and off-site included) is given by:
Emt − Emt−1
Emt−1
(1.2.3)
4
where Em is Total Emissions= Emissions Recycled+ Emissions Recovered+ Emissions
Treated+ Emissions Released. Recycled is the amount in lbs. of chemical recycled,
Recovered is the amount in lbs. of chemical combusted for energy recovery, Treated
is the amount in lbs. of chemical treated, and Disposed or otherwise released is the
amount in lbs. of chemical disposed or otherwise released. Em is total emissions,
measured in lbs. The value for total emissions for t (when t is less than 2003) comes
from summation of fields 100, 101, 98, 99, 93, 102, and 103 in TRI basic dataset. If t
is greater than or equal to 2003, total emissions come from summation of fields 100,
101, 98, 99, 94, 95, 96, 97, 102, and 103 in TRI basic dataset.
1.3 Description and definitions of waste management techniques by the
EPA
The following explanation for on-site and off-site waste management tech-
niques such as recycling, energy recovery, treatment, disposed or otherwise released is
given by the EPA (USEPA, 2015).
Quantity Disposed of or Otherwise Released On-and Off-site (Section 8.1):
This is the total quantity of the toxic chemical that was released to the environment
or disposed of at the facility (discharged to air, land, water and injected underground
on-site) or sent off-site for disposal or other release. This quantity is the sum of the
amounts reported in Sections 5 and 6 of Form R (onsite disposal or other releases plus
off-site transfers to disposal or other releases and transfers to POTWs of chemicals
such as metals and metal compounds that are not destroyed at the POTW) less any
amount(s) associated with one-time events. Beginning in the 2003 reporting year,
Section 8.1 was divided into four Subsections:
• Total on-site disposal to Class I, Underground Injection Wells, RCRA Subtitle
C landfills and other landfills (Section 8.1a),
• Total other on-site disposal or other releases (Section 8.1b),
• Total off-site disposal to Class I Underground Injection Wells, RCRA Subtitle C
landfills and other landfills (Section 8.1c) and
• Total other off-site disposal or other releases (Section 8.1d).
Combusted for Energy Recovery On-site (Section 8.2): This is the quantity
of the toxic chemical that was combusted in some form of energy recovery device, such
as a furnace (including kilns) or boiler. The toxic chemical should have a heating value
5
high enough to sustain combustion. To avoid double-counting, the amount reported
represents the amount destroyed in the combustion process, not the amount that
entered the energy recovery unit. For example, 100,000 pounds of toluene entered
a boiler that, on average, combusted 98% of the toluene. Any remaining toluene
was discharged to air. A total of 98,000 pounds is reported as combusted for energy
recovery (the remaining 2,000 pounds is reported as disposed of or otherwise released).
Combusted for Energy Recovery Off-Site (Section 8.3): This is the quantity
of the toxic chemical that left the facility boundary for energy recovery, not the amount
combusted at the off-site location. The toxic chemical must have a significant heating
value and the off-site location must have some form of energy recovery unit in place.
This quantity includes the amount(s) reported in section 6 of Form R as transferred
off-site for energy recovery, less any amount(s) associated with non-routine events.
Recycled On-Site (Section 8.4): This is the quantity of the toxic chemical recov-
ered at the facility and made available for further use. To avoid double-counting,
the amount reported represents the amount exiting the recycling unit. It is not the
quantity that entered an on-site recycling or recovery operation. For example, 3,000
pounds of a listed chemical enters a recycling operation. Of this, 500 pounds of the
chemical are in residues from the recycling operation that are subsequently sent offsite
for disposal. The quantity reported as recycled on-site would be 2,500 pounds.
Recycled Off-Site (Section 8.5): This is the quantity of the toxic chemical that left
the facility boundary for recycling, not the amount recovered at the off-site location.
This quantity includes the amount(s) reported in Section 6 of Form R as transferred
off-site for recycling, less any amount(s) associated with non-routine events.
Treated On-Site (Section 8.6): This is the quantity of the toxic chemical destroyed
in on-site waste treatment operations, not the amount that entered a treatment oper-
ation. For example, if 100,000 pounds of benzene were combusted in an incinerator
that destroyed 99% of the benzene, the facility would report 99,000 pounds as treated
on-site (the remaining 1,000 pounds would be reported as disposed of or otherwise
released).
Treated Off-Site (Section 8.7): This is the quantity of the toxic chemical that left
the facility boundary and was sent to POTWs or other off-site locations for treatment,
excluding quantities sent to POTWs but not actually destroyed (such as quantities
of metals and metal category compounds). This quantity includes the amount(s)
reported in Section 6 of Form R as transferred to POTWs or other off-site locations for
6
treatment, less any amount(s) associated with non-routine events and not including
quantities not destroyed at POTWs.
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1.4 Figures
Figure 1.1: Waste Management Heirarchy by Pollution Prevention
Act 1990
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Chapter 2 Impact of Foreign Competition on US Facilities’
Environmental Behavior1
We empirically evaluate domestic facilities’ environmental response to Chinese
import competition in the United States (US) manufacturing sector from 2000 to
2010, a period when the US experienced enormous rise in Chinese imports. Using
facility-level data on chemical emissions and employing an instrumental variables
approach, we explore two main channels through which the China trade shock might
affect US environmental outcomes: (i) influencing the environmental decisions of
domestic facilities and (ii) affecting the survival of dirtier facilities. We find that
industry/regional exposure to increased import competition had very little impact on
the environmental decisions of domestic facilities. However, we also found that not
only did import competition increase the probability of exit of facilities, but industry
exposure to import competition was also associated with a disproportionately high
rate of exit of dirty facilities. In contrast, we find that regional exposure to the China
trade shock actually increased the (relative) survival rate of dirty facilities.
1This chapter is joint work with Josh Ederington, Lala Ma, and Felipe Benguria.
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2.1 Introduction
We empirically investigate how the growth in imports from China to the
United States (US) manufacturing sector from 2000 to 2010 affects the environmental
performance of facilities in the US with respect to their waste management activities,
particularly recycling/releasing the emissions, and reducing their chemical emissions
at the source. In addition, we investigate whether this exposure to increased import
competition from China had a differential effect on the survival rates of cleaner versus
dirtier facilities. We perform a facility-level analysis using the Toxic Release Inventory
(TRI) dataset from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). Our
goal is to examine how increased import competition might affect US environmental
outcomes by measuring impacts at the facility-level.
There is considerable literature to substantiate the claim that manufacturing
sector in the US has been becoming cleaner over the years (Shapiro and Walker, 2018;
Levinson, 2015). An area of considerable interest is the link between globalization
and this general “greening“ of the US manufacturing industry. The literature on the
nexus between trade and changes in pollution emissions has mainly revolved around
decomposition of changes in pollution emissions into scale effects, composition effects
and technique effects. This decomposition has been used by Grossman and Krueger
(1991) and others (for example, see Copeland and Taylor 1994; Grether, Mathys, and
de Melo 2009). Scale effects refer to the change in pollution emissions that can be
explained by change in the scale of economic activity. Composition effects denote the
change in pollution emissions that can be explained by the change in composition
of economic activity and technique effects refer to the change in pollution emissions
resulting from a change in emission intensities or in techniques used to produce output.
This literature has tended to find that the reduction in emissions within the US (and
other high-income countries) is primarily due to technique effects (i.e., a reduction in
emission intensity across US industries).2
However, studies in this area have mainly focused on the decomposition
carried out at aggregate levels such as country or industry (for instance, Levinson 2015;
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor 2001; Grether, Mathys, and de Melo 2009; Brunel
2017). Only a few recent studies have examined these effects at the more disaggregate
2See, for instance, Levinson 2009; Levinson 2015; Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor 2001; Grether,
Mathys, and de Melo 2009. Indeed, a direct estimation of the technique effect by Levinson (2015)
suggested that the technique effect accounted for 90% of the cleanup of the US manufacturing sector.
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level, that is, firm-level (for instance, Martin 2011; Cherniwchan, Copeland, and
Taylor 2013; Barrows, Ollivier, et al. 2016). Even though the decomposition at the
industry level captures changes across industries, as Cherniwchan et al. (2017) point
out, it fails to take into account the within-firm and across-firm changes that might
play a role in influencing the changes at the industry level. Failing to pay attention
to these microlevel changes, they argue, can lead one to make untenable claims by
failing to distinguish between industry technique effects and firm level composition
effects.3 They develop a partial equilibrium model for a firm level decomposition of
changes in pollution emissions to incorporate within-firm and across-firm adjustments.
It decomposes the industry level technique effect into firm technique effects (firm-
level emission intensities)4 and firm composition effects (change in market shares on
entry/exit of dirtier vs. cleaner facilities). Our study focuses specifically on such
within-facility and across-facility changes: does increased import competition change
environmental behavior at the facility level and does it change industry emission
intensity by forcing dirtier facilities to exit?
For our empirical analysis, we exploit the variation in regional and industry
exposure (of facilities) to Chinese import competition. 5 The identification for our
analysis comes from isolating the change in Chinese imports to the US that is caused
by the supply side shock in China during the period 2000 to 2010. We adopt this
identification strategy from Autor et al. (2016) and Autor et al. (2013). For this
approach, we instrument the change in imports from China into the US with the
change in Chinese imports to eight other high-income countries6.
We find very small effects of regional as well as industry exposure to import
competition on facilities’ getting cleaner. Specifically, a facility in an industry at the
3One can claim that the decrease in industrial emission intensities (for instance, if a strict
environmental policy is imposed) can be attributed to the decrease in emission intensities at the firm
level. However, it is not necessary that the firm-level emission intensities reduced as a result of the
policy. The industry level emissions could also decrease if dirtier firms exited the industry or cleaner
firms lost market share (Cherniwchan et al., 2017).
4This technique effect also includes firm reorganization effect which refers to change in the
utilization of cleaner vs. dirtier tasks, changes in amount of outsourcing, offshoring, and change in
firm’s mark up (Cherniwchan et al., 2017).
5Autor et al. (2013) analyze the effects of Chinese import competition on US local labor markets
(that contain manufacturing industries) from 1990 to 2007 by exploiting regional exposure to imports.
Autor et al. (2016) study impact of Chinese import competition on US innovation. Acemoglu
et al. (2016) examine the relationship between Chinese import competition and US manufacturing
employment from 1999 to 2011.
6These eight countries are: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain,
and Switzerland.
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90th percentile of exposure increased its share of emissions recycled by 5 percent,
number of source reduction activities by 2 percentage points and was 1 percentage
point more likely to conduct a source reduction activity than a comparable facility
at the 10th percentile. In addition, a facility in a county at the 90th percentile of
exposure had no change in its share of emissions released but increased its share of
emissions recycled by 1 percentage point when compared to a facility at the 10th
percentile. These results provide evidence that increase in foreign competition leads
to cleaner behavior by US facilities.
We also find that both regional and industry exposure to the China shock
reduced the probability of survival of TRI facilities. However, industry exposure
was associated with a disproportionately high rate of exit of dirty facilities, there by
providing evidence that import competition might be accelerating the driving out
of dirty facilities. In contrast, we actually find that regional exposure to the China
shock increases the (relative) probability of survival of dirty facilities. This is perhaps
due to regional exposure reducing incomes in the affected regions and thus, perhaps,
reducing community pressures to eliminate dirty facilities.
In general, our study contributes to a recent literature that uses firm-level
analysis to examine the relationship between international trade and firms environ-
mental behavior. Primarily this literature has focused on the link between exporting
and the environment. For instance, utilizing Irish firm-level data, Batrakova and
Davies (2012) explore how being an exporter affects a firms energy consumption. Even
though higher production entailed in exporting increases firms energy consumption,
the study claims that the use of energy efficient technology countervails that effect.
Their findings suggest that the energy used when exporting is negatively related to
energy intensity. Rodrigue and Soumonni (2014) use firm-level data from Indone-
sian timber manufacturers to structurally estimate a model of firms’ investment in
environmental abatement and exporting. Their results indicate that investment in
environmental abatement does not have any significant effect on productivity but
positively affects export demand. A more recent article by Forslid et al. (2018) uses
Swedish firm-level data and builds a model to explain why exporting firms might
have lower emission intensities than non-exporting firms. Finally, by modelling the
relationship between export orientation, import competition, and pollution levels using
a panel of facility-level data from 1990 to 2006, Holladay (2016) finds that exporters
experience a reduction of 9 to 13% in emissions and that, in a given industry, exporters
12
are less likely to pollute than non-exporters.
In contrast, we look at the effect of import competition on individual facilities’
environmental response. Thus, our study is closest to Cherniwchan (2017). Using
National Establishment Time Series (NETS) and TRI data, he examines the effect of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on toxic emissions (particulate
matter and sulfur dioxide) of US manufacturing facilities. NAFTA, according to his
findings, resulted in around two-thirds of the reduction in these emissions between 1994
and 1998. He argues that the effects were mainly driven by within-facility changes (e.g.,
adopting new technologies and changing the mix of imported intermediate inputs)7.
Our paper makes several contributions to this literature. First, our study
utilizes the significant increase in import competition from China to investigate
the impact of foreign competition on facilities’ environmental decisions and exit
decisions. There is a growing body of literature that has looked at the effect of Chinese
import shock on a variety of outcomes: US labor markets (Autor et al., 2013), US
manufacturing employment and job growth (Acemoglu et al., 2016), US innovation
(Autor et al., 2016), and innovation in European countries (Bloom et al., 2016). Given
the size of the China shock, it stands to reason that if there are significant effects
of globalization on U.S. environmental outcomes, these effects should appear during
this period. Second, we utilize both regional and industry variation in exposure to
imports in investigating the effect of trade on facilities’ environmental decisions. The
previous literature has uniformly used industry variation in trade exposure, however,
to the extent that facilities’ environmental decisions are a function of local regulatory
and public pressures, it seems that environmental behavior might also be affected by
the impact of globalization on the local economy (e.g., if foreign competition leads
to a depressed local economy, does that relax pressure on local facilities to engage
in cleaner behavior?). Finally, we focus directly on the underlying environmental
activities that facilities undertake: namely recycling and source reduction of chemical
emissions. Previous papers have tended to measure environmental behavior indirectly
through investigating the emissions intensity of firms (typically emissions scaled by the
value added or sales of the firm). While having the advantage of being an important
outcome, scaled emissions have the disadvantage that globalization could affect either
7Cherniwchan (2017) finds evidence of pollution haven hypothesis. Because of the differences
in environmental regulations between US and Mexico, the production of dirty intermediate inputs
seemed to shift to Mexico (thereby it becoming a pollution haven).
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by impacting the numerator (emissions) or the denominator (sales).8 Our approach is
complementary to these previous papers in that we use measures of the underlying
activites of the firms (e.g., percent of emissions recycled) that attempts to circumvent
the problem of including measures of facility’s revenue for the dependent variable. The
paper is structured as follows: In Section 2.2, we provide a discussion linking foreign
import competition and facilities’ environmental decisions. Section 2.3 describes the
data. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present the empirics and results for the firm technique
effect and firm composition effect respectively. Lastly, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Foreign Import Competition and Facilities’ Environmental decisions
Changes in a facility’s environmental behavior and facility composition effects
(through facility exit decisions) are important components of the technique effect at
the industry level. We attempt to decipher the link between foreign competition and
environmental outcomes by evaluating (1) if import competition is giving rise to a
technique effect (lower emission intensities) at the facility level and (2) if it is leading
to a change in the composition of facilities in an industry by driving out facilities
based on how clean or dirty they are. We begin by looking at the determinants of
facilities’ environmental behavior. Environmental actions by facilities are influenced
by mandatory as well as voluntary incentives. For instance, all the chemicals in our
study are subject to TRI reporting requirements through the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) section 313 (see discussion on the
reporting requirements in Section 1.1). However, many of the TRI chemicals are
also subject to other regulations. In some cases these regulations involve additional
reporting requriments: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), EPCRA section 302.9 In other cases they regulate
the handling of the pollutant: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
8For example, trade might affect prices which could in turn affect emission intensities without
changing environmental behavior. It is not even clear which way the bias would go. Trade could
reduce the prices of the firms’ products which, in turn, would increase measures of emission intensity.
Alternatively, trade could lead to the off-shoring or dropping of low price (low value-added) products
thus leading to an increase in measured emission intensity.
9CERCLA: Facilities must report releases that exceed reportable quantities (RQs) to National
Response Center. These RQs depend on aquatic toxicity, acute mammalian toxicity, ignitability,
reactivity, chronic toxicity, and carcinogenicity. EPCRA section 302: facilities must report to State
Emergency Response Commission if they contain extremely hazardous substance (EHSs) in amounts
that exceed their Threshold Planning Quantities (TPQs). TPQs depend on acute toxicity and other
characteristics of the chemical. For more information see USEPA (2012).
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(FIFRA) and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)10. In some cases they
establish national emission standards: National Primary Drinking Water Regulations
(NPDWR), Clean Air Act (CAA)11. And, finally, some laws are enforced at the state
level: Cal. Health Safety Code 105440-105459, 2010 Conn. Acts 164 (Reg. Sess.),
Md. Code Ann., Education 5-112 (2012). Chapter No. 454; Amended 2012 (H.B.
1019).
These traditional environmental monitoring and enforcement activities (manda-
tory approaches), as claimed by Gray and Shimshack (2011) in their review of empirical
studies, are potential determinants of facilities’ environmental behavior. On the other
hand, there are also non-regulatory pressures that induce facilities to adopt volun-
tary initiatives for environmental self-regulation. Anton et al. (2004) analyze the
determinants of facilities’ voluntary environmental decisions with an emphasis on
TRI reporting facilities. They find that the pressures from consumers, investors and
the public and liability threats may encourage polluting facilities to voluntary adopt
environmental management strategies. Consumer pressures, they claim, are most likely
to motivate facilities to integrate more comprehensive environmental management
measures. According to the study, these comprehensive environmental management
measures lead to a reduction in toxic emissions per unit of output.12
Another important factor that may lead to the voluntary adoption of self-
regulation is the media coverage and the response on the stock market to the annual
release of the TRI publication. Hamilton (1995a) found that the more the emissions
reported by a facility, the more likely it was to receive media coverage. Also, the
greater the number of chemical submissions reported, the poorer was the facility’s
performance on the stock market. Moreover, the facilities that experienced the steepest
decline in their stock prices due to the release of TRI information, were more likely
than other facilities in their industry to reduce emissions (Konar and Cohen, 1997).
So how might trade exposure (either industry or regional) impact facilities’
environmental decisions? First, consider how industry exposure to foreign competition
might affect facilities’ environmental decisions (the technique effect). One possibility
10FIFRA governs the development, sale, distribution, and use of pesticides. RCRA manages and
regulates hazardous waste.
11CAA: provides national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants and monitoring re-
quirements for facilities, NPDWR: provides maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) for particular
chemicals.
12According to Anton et al. (2004), an anecdotal evidence suggests that a Dow chemical facility
was able to reduce around 7 million pounds of emissions and save around $5 million in a two- year
period by voluntarily adopting source reduction techniques.
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is that foreign competition leads to increase in technical change within firms (as
in Bloom et al. (2016)), which could result in firms utilizing modern, and thus
cleaner, technological processes to stay competitive. This move towards cleaner
technology and pressure to maintain a reputation might promote facility’s investment
in environmentally sustainable activities. Another possibility is that in the industries
that are exposed to heavy import competition, facilities might be pushed to focus on
short term profits, be more likely to focus on their short -term survival and scale back
from spending on environmental activities that have longer term reputational benefits
(since they might even place a lower probability on their long-run survival). Thus,
theoretical link between foreign competition and facility-level environmental behavior
is ambiguous.
Next, consider how such industry exposure might affect facility compositional
effects (i.e., the market share of dirtier facility). It is almost conventional wisdom now
that globabilization has led to the exit of low-productivity firms (see, for instance,
Melitz 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano 2008; ). To the extent that these low-productivity
firms are using older and low-tech (and, thus, typically dirtier) production processes
(see, for example, Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 2006; Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen
2016), it is possible that industry exposure might shift market share in favor of cleaner
facilities (i.e., relatively higher exit rate of dirtier facilities).
Third, consider how regional exposure to foreign competition might affect
facilities’ environmental decisions (the technique effect). Regions attempt to find
balance between their local economic activity and the environment. When the region
is functioning well economically, the facilities might feel greater pressure to invest in
expensive activities such as recycling, recovering, treating, and source reducing the
chemicals. On the other hand, when the regional economy is not performing well, a
facility in that region might face the pressure to focus on short term profits and hence
will not be able to spend much on environmentally sustainable activities that could
increase their long run benefits with respect to, for example, reputation. These reduced
pressures could arise from either mandatory sources (reduced enforcement of existing
regulations) or voluntary sources (reduced societal pressures or lower probability of
successful lawsuits).
Finally, consider how such regional exposure might affect facility composi-
tional effects (i.e., the market share of dirtier facilities). According to the environmental
injustice hypothesis, a facility is more likely to locate or carry out polluting actions
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in areas that are racially segregated, have lower compensation costs, land prices,
have lower incomes or lower propensity of collection action (Hamilton, 1995a). Autor
et al. (2013) find adverse effects of Chinese import shock on US local labor markets.
Specifically, they find reductions in wages (not only in manufacturing sector but also
outside of the sector), employment and household income, and marked increase in
transfer benefit payments. Their findings suggest that these effects would have a
bigger impact on low-income neighborhoods. Combining the environmental injustice
theory with their findings indicates that there may be less pressure on facilities to stop
dirtier production processes in more trade exposed regions. Thus regional exposure to
trade might lead to (relatively) higher likelihood of dirty facilities to survive in more
exposed areas.
2.3 Data
We match facility level environmental data from 2000 to 2010 to industry-
level trade data on imports from China into the US during the same time period, using
6-digit NAICS industry codes. Our unit of observation is facility-chemical-NAICS
industry (6-digit).
2.3.1 Trade Data
Chinese import data, from 2000 to 2010 at the industry level, are reported by
US Census Bureau (Schott, 2008).13 Over the recent years, imports from China to the
United States (US) have grown significantly. In absolute terms, Chinese imports into
the US increased fourfold from around US$100 bn to US$425 bn from 2000 to 2010.
Figure 2.1 shows the trend in US imports from China as a share of total US imports
and in import penetration ratio for US imports from China from 1998 to 2012.14 From
1998 to 2012, the share of US imports from China rose by around 11 percentage points
or more than doubled.15 During the same period, import penetration ratio went up
13We obtain the data from https://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/
international-trade-data/. The data are originally reported by the US Census Bureau.
14The import penetration is computed as the ratio of US imports from China divided by total US
production (measured by annual US Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) plus total US imports minus
total US exports. The data for annual US imports from Chinese, total US imports, and total US
exports are obtained from US Census Bureau website. The data for US GDP comes from the World
Bank indicators.
15The value of US imports from Chinese and total US imports are obtained from US Census
Bureau website.
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by 333% from 0.006 to 0.026.
To exploit industry as well as regional variation in exposure to import
competition, we compute the industry exposure and regional (county level) exposure
respectively. For the estimation of industry import exposure, we use, in addition to
the trade data, the manufacturing industry production data. The US manufacturing
industry production data comes from National Bureau of Economic Research-Center
for Economic Studies (NBER-CES) manufacturing industry database. Following Autor
et al. (2016), industry exposure to Chinese import competition over the period 2000
to 2010 is given by:
∆IPi =
∆Muci
Yi,2000 +Mi,2000 −Xi,2000
(2.3.1)
where ∆IPi is the change in a facility’s industry exposure to import competi-
tion (import penetration) from 2000 to 2010, ∆Muci is the change in Chinese imports
into the US for industry i from the period 2000 to 2010. The denominator is the
initial absorption or total US expenditure on Chinese goods in industry i in 2000,
where Yi,2000 is the total production in industry i, measured as total value of industry
shipments, Mi,2000 is the total industry i imports to US in 2000, and Xi,2000 denotes
total industry exports from the US in the initial period 2000. Intuitively, ∆IPi is the
change in the share of total US spending on Chinese goods in industry i from 2000 to
2010.
The identification of our empirical analysis comes from isolating the change in
Chinese imports to the US that is caused by the supply-shock or growth in productivity
in China. We adopt this identification strategy from Autor et al. (2016) and Autor
et al. (2013). To deal with the endogeneity that could arise if the change in import
exposure were the result of domestic US demand shocks and these demand shocks
might be correlated with imports as well as the chemical emissions, we instrument
change in imports from China into the US with change in Chinese imports to eight
other high-income countries16. We borrow this instrument from Autor et al. (2016).
∆IPi =
∆M otci
Yi,2000 +Mi,2000 −Xi,2000
(2.3.2)
where ∆M otci is the change in Chinese imports into the other eight high-
income countries for industry i from the period 2000 to 2010. There are two main
16For the list of countries, see footnote 6.
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assumptions underlying this instrumental variables strategy. First, the product demand
shocks in high-income countries are not primarily driving the Chinese import exposure
to these countries and second, and second, there is no correlation between domestic
product demand shocks in the US and other eight countries.17
There are 586 6-digit NAICS industries represented by facilities in 2000
and 540 in 2010. For the facilities that reported in 2000 as well as 2010, there were
459 (6-digit NAICS) industries. Table 2.1 presents the changes in industry exposure
to Chinese import competition from 2000 to 2010 for four of the highly exposed
3-digit manufacturing industries and for four of less exposed industries.18 We see that
industries that have had the highest change in exposure to import competition are
Chemical Manufacturing, Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing, and Machinery
Manufacturing. Industries with the lowest change in exposure to import competition
include those such as Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing, Petroleum and
Coal Products Manufacturing, and Printing and Related Support Activities among
others.
For the computation of regional import exposure, we use, along with the
trade data, the county employment data. County Business Patterns database by
the US Census Bureau provides annual data on county level employment. Regional
exposure to Chinese import competition from 2000 to 2010 is given by (following
(Autor et al., 2013)):
∆IPr =
∑
i
Lri
Lui
∆Muci
Lr
(2.3.3)
where Lri is the employment in year 2000 in region r in industry i. Lr is the
total employment in year 2000 in region r, Lui is the total employment in industry i in
the US. ∆Mi is the observed change in US imports from China from 2000 to 2010 in
industry i. ∆IPr is a weighted sum of changes in US imports from China from 2000
to 2010 in industry i, where the weight is the county’s share of national employment
in industry i at the start of period 2000.
We use a similar instrumental variable approach (following Autor et al.
(2013)) as above to deal with the possible endogeneity of regional trade exposure as
17Autor et al. (2013) provides detailed discussion on potential threats to this instrumental variables
strategy and ways of dealing with them.
18There are a total of 21 3-digit NAICS manufacturing industries for which facilities reported in
both 2000 and 2010. To compute the change in industry exposure of these industries, we aggregated
the change in industry exposure from 6-digit NAICS industry codes to 3-digit NAICS codes.
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well. The instrumental variable for the regional exposure is given by:
∆IPr =
∑
i
Lri
Lui
∆M otci
Lr
(2.3.4)
where ∆M otci is the change in Chinese imports to the other eight high-income
countries for industry i from the period 2000 to 2010. Autor et al. (2013) analyze the
effects of Chinese import competition on US local labor markets from 1990 to 2007.
Whereas they look at these effects on the US labor market by exploiting regional
variation, our interest lies in finding the impact on individual facilities’ environmental
decisions by taking both regional and industry variation into consideration.
Chapter 1 provides a detailed explanation of our data sources. Figure 2.2
maps the cross-county variation in import competition from 2000 to 2010. The
majority of the counties lie within exposure of 0 and 2 kUS$ imports per worker.
2.3.2 Environmental Data
The environmental data at the facility level used in this analysis is described
in Chapter 1. Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for total emissions in millions
of pounds, the percentage of these emissions that are released or recycled, and the
number of source reduction activities. Panels 1 and 2 respectively give these data in
the years 2000 and 2010, and panel 3 provides the differences across time. Comparing
emissions in panels 1 and 2, total chemical emissions have reduced by an average of
100,000 pounds from 2000 to 2010.
The breakdown of emissions by activity shows that while the share of emis-
sions released remains almost identical in 2000 and 2010, the share of emissions recycled
increases by 4 percentage points from 19% to 23% from 2000 to 2010. The number
of facilities that reported to the TRI in 2010 fell by around 2400 when compared to
the year 2000. In panel 3, we see that, on average, the change in emissions tends to
be small. However, the large standard deviations indicate that there is substantial
heterogeneity in emissions changes across facilities, which we utilize for our analysis.
In addition, it is to be noted that because of missing data on emissions that were
released/recycled, we see a reduction in the number of facilities that reported emissions
that were released/recycled when compared to total emissions.
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2.4 Empirics - Technique Effect
In this section we attempt to uncover the effect of foreign import competition
on facility-level environmental behavior (ie., the facility technique effect). To do so, we
utilize the EPA’s hierarchy of waste management activities in which source reduction
and recycling are the most preferable activities and the release of the emissions is
the least preferable choice. We specifically estimate whether facilities in industries or
regions which were more exposed to the China trade shock switched to engaging in
the more preferable (recycling or source reduction) activities relative to less desirable
activities (release of emissions).
To observe this technique effect at the facility level, we estimate the following
model:
Y 2010fci = β0 Y 2000fci + β1∆IPi + β2∆IPr + αn + αd + αc + εfci (2.4.1)
where the dependent variable Y 2010fci is a measure of the environmental
behavior related to chemical c of facility f in industry i and region r in the year 2010,
which is either the percent of emissions of chemical c released/recycled or the number
of source reduction activities. ∆IPr is the change in Chinese import exposure for
region r (county-level) and ∆IPi is the change in Chinese import competition for
industry i (six-digit NAICS level).19 The parameters of interest are β1 and β2, which
depict the estimated effect of industry and regional exposure to import competition
on environmental behavior.
Since we are focusing on the facility-level technique effect, we restrict the
set of facilities to those that reported in 2000 as well as in 2010.20 We use a lagged
dependent variable, the start-of-period environmental decision Y 2000fci, to control for
time-invariant facility-chemical characteristics that may influence the choice of waste
management techniques.21
The unit of observation is a facility-chemical-industry (f-c-i) pair (where
industry is at the six-digit NAICS level). We include chemical (αc), two-digit NAICS
industry (αn), and Census division (αc) fixed effects. The chemical fixed effects account
for the effect of any changes in environmental regulations (which usually apply to
19See discussion in 3.1.
20Note, we include those facilities that may have dropped from the TRI dataset in the intervening
years. Our only requirement is that they reported at the starting and endpoint of our analysis. Out
of the 24,193 facilities in 2000 and 21,807 in 2010, 11,972 reported in 2000 as well as 2010.
21We also ran a first difference model and found similar results to those from adding a lagged
dependent variable.
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specific chemicals) as well as any chemical-specific technology shocks. While we are
exploiting industry/region variation across facilities in our estimation, we include more
aggregate industry/region fixed effects to control for any general trends that might be
correlated with our import shock.
2.4.1 Main results
In table 2.3 and 2.4, we present the results from ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimation of equation (2.4.1) with the following environmental actions taken by
the facilities as response variables: (i) percent of emissions released by facilities in
2010 and (ii) percent of emissions recycled by facilities in 2010 respectively. The top
panel reports the parameter estimates and the bottom panel contains the marginal
effects. While columns I and III report results from OLS estimation, columns II and
IV contain the results from two stage least squares (henceforth 2SLS) instrumental
variable (IV) estimation. As noted earlier, the change in imports from China into the
US is instrumented with the change in Chinese imports to eight other high-income
countries.
Looking at the signs of parameter estimates in table 2.3 (column I), the
change (from 2000 to 2010) in regional exposure (measured in kUS$) and change
(from 2000 to 2010) in industry exposure affect the share of the emissions released
negatively (although the estimate is only statistically significant for regional exposure).
This indicates that an increase in regional exposure to foreign competition leads to a
decrease in the facility’s share of emissions released into the environment. However,
the estimates from instrumental variable approach in column II are not statistically
significant. Similarly, the parameter estimates in table 2.4 (column I) suggest that
both regional and industry exposure to Chinese import competition are positively
correlated with an increase in the share of emissions recycled (and both these coefficient
estimates are statistically significant). The corresponding estimates from instrumental
variable approach (column II) indicate that regional exposure positively affects the
share of emissions recycled (although the estimate is statistically insignificant).
Moreover, calculation of marginal effects suggests that the magnitudes are
somewhat small. Bottom panel of table 2.3 and table 2.4 reports the marginal effects at
the 10th and 90th percentile of regional exposure as well as industry exposure. Column
I of table 2.3 shows that a facility at the 10th percentile of regional exposure (less
exposed) releases 43% of its total emissions whereas a facility at the 90th percentile
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of regional exposure (more exposed) releases 41% of its total emissions (a decline in
emissions released of around 2 percentage points). However, the marginal effects from
instrumental variable estimation (column II) show no change in the share of emissions
released when moving from 10th to 90th percentile of county exposure.
Similarly, from Column I of table 2.4, we see an increase in the share of
emissions recycled of 1 percentage point as we move from less exposed (10th percentile)
to more exposed (90th percentile) industries and regions. Thus, a fairly significant
increase in import exposure leads to only a relatively moderate (i.e., changes of around
5 percent) changes in waste management decisions. These effects stay unaffected
from instrumental variable estimation (column II). Therefore, these results imply that
increases in regional as well as industry exposure to imports are leading to cleaner
decisions by facilities.
While our focus on the underlying environmental behavior of the facilities
was designed to minimize problems associated with having to scale the dependent
variable by measures of facility production, it is still possible that increased import
competition could affect a facility’s environmental decisions by affecting facility size.
Specifically, assume there are economies of scale to the decision to recycle emissions
(e.g., only facilities with a sufficiently large amount of emissions will undergo the
fixed costs associated with recycling rather than releasing the emissions). In this case,
facilities exposed to heavy import competition might shrink in size and thus be less
willing to pay the fixed costs of recycling. Thus, to control for this indirect effect, we
include data on the percentage change in emissions (from 2000-2010) as an additional
covariate to equation (2.4.1). Results are shown in columns III of table 2.3 and table
2.4. As can be seen, we find evidence for this fixed cost story as an increase in emissions
is correlated with a decrease in the share of emissions released and an increase in the
share of emissions recycled. In addition, the coefficient estimates and marginal effects
on our regional and industry exposure variables (as well as their the level of statistical
significance) remain unchanged when compared to the results in column I. Thus, even
controlling for scale changes, we continue to find that increased exposure to foreign
competition is associated with cleaner waste management techniques. However, while
the marginal effects remain almost the same, the parameter estimates seem to become
statistically insignificant with instrumental variable estimation (column IV of table
2.3 and table 2.4).
Next, we look at the impact of foreign competition on reported source
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reduction activities (the most prefered waste management activity). Table 2.5 and
table 2.6 provide a summary of the results from our estimation22 of equation (2.4.1)
with the following dependent variables: (i) a dummy for whether the facility conducted
any source reduction activities in 2010 and (ii) the number of source reduction activities
conducted by the facilities in 2010 to reduce the amount of emissions released, recycled,
recovered, and treated for chemical c respectively. While columns I and III report
results from OLS estimation, columns II and IV contain the results from instrumental
variable estimation. The top panel reports parameter estimates and the bottom panel
reports marginal effects. The sign of parameter estimates in column I of table 2.5 and
table 2.6 suggest that the change (from 2000 to 2010) in industry exposures tend to
increase the likelihood that a facility would conduct a source reduction activity as
well as increase the total number of source reduction activities (with the estimate on
industry exposure being statistically significant). However, we do not observe any
statistically significant relationship between regional exposure and source reduction
activities. As before, columns III (OLS estimation) and IV (instrumental variable
estimation) of table 2.5 and table 2.6 include the percentage change in emissions
as an additional regressor to control for scale effects and the coefficient estimates
remain almost unchanged. Therefore, similar to the results for the release/recycle of
emissions, we continue to find that an increase in exposure to foreign competition (at
least industry exposure) leads to cleaner waste management behavior on the part of
facilities.
Turning to the marginal effects for industry exposure, a facility at the 90th
percentile of change in industry exposure (as presented in column I) is 1 percentage
point or (14.3%) more likely to conduct a source reduction activity than a comparable
facility at the less exposed 10th percentile. Moreover, moving from 10th to 90th
percentile of change in industry exposure, a facility increased its number of source
reduction activities by 2 percentage points (or 16.7%). Hence, although the effect of
industry exposure on waste management behavior is strongly statistically significant,
we continue to see only a moderate increase in terms of magnitude. The marginal
effects from instrumental variable estimation (column II) do not effect these results.
22We run an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation for these regressions.
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2.5 Empirics - Composition Effect
In this section we attempt to uncover the effect of foreign import competition
on facility exit decisions and how that might interact with the greening of American
industry (ie., the facility composition effect). The main question of interest is whether
increased foreign competition disproportionately causes dirtier facilities to exit, thus
potentially leading to better environmental outcomes in either affected regions or
industries. To do so we investigate the survival rates of facilities that were reporting
TRI emissions in 2000 (i.e., whether the facility continued to report TRI emissions
of that specific chemical in 2010). Given this definition for survival, the reasons for
exit in 2010 could include the following: in 2010 the facility: 1) shut-down completely,
2) stopped producing the chemical 3) exited the industry (i.e., changed its industry
classification from the one in 2000) or 4) decreased its production of the chemical
to under the threshold amount for reporting. Thus, to better capture facility-level
compositional changes, we take a broad definition of exit which encompasses not
just facilities shutting-down but also facilities stopping (or reducing) the production
processes that resulted in TRI emissions. Out of the 92,898 facility-chemical-industry
pairs present in 2000, 45.9% survived in 2010.23
To look at the facility composition effect, we estimate the following linear
probability model (henceforth LPM):
FacSurvival2010fci = β0Y 2000fci + β1∆IPr + β2∆IPi + β3∆IPr × Y 2000fci+
β4∆IPi × Y 2000fci + αn + αd + αc + (Emissions2000)fci + εfci (2.5.1)
where the dependent variable FacSurvival2010fci is a 0, 1 indicator variable that
takes on the value 1 if facility f , in industry i and region r, reported emissions of
chemical c in year 2000 also reports emissions of chemical c in year 2010.
As before Y 2000fci is a measure of a facility’s environmental behavior in 2000:
the percent of emissions of chemical c released/recycled by facilities or the number of
source reduction activities conducted. Conventional wisdom is that lower-productivity
firms which typically employ older (and thus dirtier production processes) or more
likely to exit. Thus, we expect that “dirtier” facilities in our sample (e.g., those that
recycle a lower share of emissions or release a higher share) would be more likely to
exit.
23That is, there were 42,607 facility-chemical-industry pairs that survived in 2010.
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Once again ∆IPr and ∆IPi denote the changes in Chinese import exposure
for region r and industry i from 2000 to 2010. Our expectation is that exposure to
increased foreign competition at the industry level should increase the probability of
facility exit (β2 < 0). However, the affect of regional exposure on facility exit decisions
(β1) is more ambiguous. As shown by Autor et al. (2013), the China import shock
had a significant, negative impact on local labor markets that were more exposed to
Chinese exports. However, this depression of the local labor market could lead to
a higher probability of exit as it reduces local demand or it could lead to a higher
probability of survival as it potentially frees up resources (i.e., lower wage workers)
for the facility.
The new items of interest are the coefficients on the interaction effects: β3
and β4. ∆IPr × Y 2000fci is the interaction between change in regional exposure
and the dirtiness measure. ∆IPi × Y 2000fci is the interaction between change in
industry exposure and the dirtiness measure. These capture whether exposure to
foreign competition (at either the industry or regional level) has a disproportionately
negative effect on the survival of “dirtier” facilities. If this is the case, than it might
explain how globalization could lead to the greening of the US industry by driving
dirtier facilities out of the market.
Finally, (Emissions2000)fci is a measure of year 2000 emissions for a facility-
chemical-industry observation. This is included as a measure of production scale under
the assumption that larger facilities are more likely to survive. Finally, we once again
include αn, αd, and αc (two-digit NAICS industry, Census division, and chemical fixed
effects respectively).
2.5.1 Results - Selection issue
Table 2.7 and 2.8 report the results from estimating the selection equation
(2.5.1) with dirtiness measures: (i) share of emissions released and recycled, (ii) whether
source reduction activity is conducted and the number of source reduction activities
undertaken respectively. Columns I and III report results from LPM estimation and
columns II and IV contain the results from 2SLS estimation.
The coefficient estimates for dirtiness measures in row 1 of Table 2.7 and 2.8
imply that the higher the share of emissions a facility released in 2000 the less likely
it was to survive in 2010. On the other hand, the more a facility conducted cleaner
activities such as recycling or source reduction, the higher were its chances of survival
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in 2010. Specifically, if the share of emissions released by a facility in 2000 go up by
one percentage point, the likelihood of a facility’s survival in 2010 decreases by 7.1%,
ceteris paribus. But if the share of emissions recycled by a facility in 2000 go up by
one percentage point, the probability of survival in 2010 increases by 7.1%. Similarly,
if the facility conducted a source reduction activity in 2000, it is 4.7% more likely to
survive in 2010. These estimates are highly statistically significant. Moreover, the
results from 2SLS instrumental variable estimation, reported in columns II and IV,
reinforce these findings. Thus, we do find evidence that the general pattern of exit
seems to favor the survival of cleaner facilities.
Second, observe the coefficient estimates for our measures of regional (IPr)
and industry (IPi) exposure in table 2.7 and 2.8. For all the dirtiness measures,
industry exposure leads to lower probability of facility’s survival. In the case of share
of emissions recycled and source reduction activities, regional exposure leads to higher
probability of facility’s survival. While the coefficient estimates for regional exposure
are not statistically significant, coefficient estimate for industry exposure remains
statistically significant for all measures of dirtiness. Hence we find support for our
hypothesis that increase in industry exposure to foreign competition might lead to
facilities’ exit. For a facility at the median with respect to share of emissions released
in 2000, moving from less exposed industry to a more exposed industry reduces its
survival in 2010 by 2.9 percentage points.
Thus, we have found evidence that dirtier facilities are more likely to exit
and that at least industry exposure to import competition increases the rate of exit.
However, the next question is whether this exposure has a disproportionately negative
impact on the survival of dirtier facilities? This is what we discuss in the following
two subsections.
2.5.1.1 Industry exposure and Facility Survival
First, consider the coefficient estimate on the interaction of the dirtiness
measures in 2000 with the industry exposure measure (column I and III of table
2.7 and 2.8). As can be seen, the signs of the coefficient estimates are inconsistent
and none of the estimates are statistically significant. Thus, while import exposure
might increase the rate of exit, we see no evidence that it disproportionately impacts
dirtier facilities. However, the corresponding 2SLS estimates in columns II and IV
are statistically significant indicating a differential impact of industry exposure on
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clean/dirty facilities.
To get a sense of these results, we provide the probability of facility survival
for different levels of industry exposure and different levels of facility dirtiness in
table 2.9 (LPM) and table 2.10 (2SLS). We use the share of emissions recycled as our
measure of facility environmental behavior. We denote facilities at the lower end (10th
percentile) of the recycle spectrum as dirty facilities and the ones at the upper end
(90th percentile) as clean facilities.24
The results in table 2.9 as well as 2.10 suggest that high industry exposure
makes it less likely for a facility to survive. Specifically, referring to table 2.9, a
dirty facility whose industry is more exposed is 2.9 percentage points less likely to
survive than a comparable dirty facility whose industry is less exposed. A clean facility
belonging to a more exposed industry is 2.7 percentage points less likely to survive.
Hence we find an (almost) equal impact of increasing industry exposure on both type
of facilities.
On the other hand, the 2SLS results (table 2.10) suggest that dirty facilities
are relatively more likely to exit than clean facilities due to industry exposure. In
particular, while a dirty facility is 7.1 percentage points more likely to exit going from
less exposed to more exposed industries, a clean facily is 2.4 percentage points more
likely to exit.
2.5.1.2 Regional exposure and Facility Survival
Table 2.11 (LPM) and 2.12 (2SLS) present the magnitudes of marginal
effects for interaction of percentage of emissions recycled and regional exposure. These
effects are statistically significant. Overall, the results from table 2.11 suggest that
facilities are less likely to survive when their county is highly exposed. Particularly,
the probability of survival for a dirty facililty is 0.3 percentage points less in a highly
exposed county than in a less exposed county. However, increasing import exposure
to a county reduces the probability of survival for a clean facility by 1.9 percentage
points. Thus dirty facilities are relatively more likely to survive in more exposed
regions.
The corresponding marginal effects from 2SLS estimation (table 2.12) rein-
force the findings from table 2.11. A dirty facility is indeed 0.3 perentage points more
likely to survive in more exposed county than in a less exposed county. On the other
24Results for the other measures are similar and available upon request.
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hand, a clean facility is 2 percentage points less likely to survive going from less to
more trade exposed county.
This result (pointing to relative ease of dirty facilities to survive in more
exposed areas) is consistent with environmental injustice theory that claims that
dirty facilities tend to locate in poor neighborhoods where they are less likely to face
collective action and where they incur lower compensation costs.25 Specifically, our
results are consistent with a story that regional exposure to import competition, by
depressing the local economy (see, for instance, Autor et al. (2013)), might actually
make it (relatively) easier for dirty facilities to continue to operate as they might face
less pressure to shutdown dirtier production processes.
2.6 Conclusion
By examining the impact of foreign competition (that is, Chinese import
competition) on environmental decisions of US manufacturing facilities, we try to
analyze the nexus between globalization and the cleanup of manufacturing sector.
Also crucial is the concern that exposure to foreign competition might lead to either
facilities focus on short-term gains (and so defer or put less emphasis on investing in
environmentally sustainable activities that would provide long-term benefits such as
enhancing reputation) or relaxed environmental enforcement by local regulators.
We find no evidence that foreign competition is leading to such outcomes.
Exposure (both regional and industry level) to foreign competition seems to be
leading to cleaner behavior by facilities (facility technique effect). In addition, industry
exposure is precipitating the process of facilities exit that naturally favors newer cleaner
facilities. Thus we find that, with respect to import competition, facility technique
effect (intensive margin) as well as facility composition effect (extensive margin) can
play a role in explaining the change in pollution emissions in US manufacturing sector.
However, we note that the magnitudes for these effects are small. In addition,
we find that dirty facilities have actually relatively better likelihood of survival in
more exposed regions. This result is consistent with the environmental injustice
theory that suggests that dirty facilities tend to locate and pollute in low-income, poor
neighborhoods where they might face less pressure to reduce their polluting activities.
25According to the hypotheses in environmental injustice theory, a facility is more likely to carry
out polluting actions in areas that are racially segregated, have lower compensation costs, land prices
or propensity of collection action(Hamilton, 1995b).
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Industries and their Exposure to Import Competition
3-digit Industry name ∆ Industry
NAICS code Exposure
325 Chemical Manufacturing 294.78
332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 102.71
333 Machinery Manufacturing 63.11
335 Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing 58.78
315 Apparel Manufacturing 1.63
323 Printing and Related Support Activities 0.86
324 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 0.71
312 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 0.02
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Obs. Facilities Chemicals
Year: 2000
Emissions (in M.lbs.) 0.36 5.99 0 870 93,586 24,193 528
% Emissions Released 0.50 0.45 0 1 76,544 20,467 502
% Emissions Recycled 0.19 0.36 0 1 76,544 20,467 502
# of Source Reduction activities 0.21 0.64 0 6 93,586 24,193 528
Year: 2010
Emissions (in M. lbs.) 0.26 3.97 0 526 81,697 21,807 496
% Emissions Released 0.50 0.46 0 1 68,959 19,061 470
% Emissions Recycled 0.23 0.40 0 1 68,959 19,061 470
# of Source Reduction activities 0.10 0.43 0 4 81,696 21,807 496
Change: 2010-2000
Emissions (in M.lbs.) -0.13 7.14 -836 364 42,607 11,972 423
% Emissions Released -0.02 0.35 -1 1 35,157 9,998 388
% Emissions Recycled (in 10k) 0.38 0.25 -1 1 35,157 9,998 388
# of Source Reduction activities -0.11 0.67 -4 4 42607 11972 423
Notes: Table reports descriptive statistics for chemical emissions and its management. S.D. denotes
Standard Deviation. Obs. refers to number of observations. M. refers to millions.
30
Table 2.3: Percent emissions released
Dependent variable
(2010)
I.Percent
Released
(OLS)
II.Percent
Released
(2SLS)
III.Percent
Released
(with scale)
(OLS)
IV.Percent
Released
(with scale)
(2SLS)
% Rel 2000 0.587*** 0.587*** 0.592*** 0.592***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Emissions pt change -0.254*** -0.254***
(0.063) (0.062)
∆ Regional Exposure -0.004* 0.000 -0.004* 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
∆ Industry Exposure -0.041 -0.063 -0.040 -0.059
(0.048) (0.119) (0.048) (0.118)
R-Squared 0.510 0.510 0.514 0.514
Observations 22233 22231 22220 22218
Percentiles
∆ Regional Exposure
10th 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
90th 0.41∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
∆ Industry Exposure
10th 0.42∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
90th 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
All regressions include two digit NAICS industry fixed effects, Census division fixed
effects, and chemical fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and
are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.4: Percent emissions recycled
Dependent variable
(2010)
I.Percent
Recycled
(OLS)
II.Percent
Recycled
(2SLS)
III.Percent
Recycled
(with scale)
(OLS)
IV.Percent
Recycled
(with scale)
(2SLS)
% Recy 2000 0.551*** 0.552*** 0.554*** 0.554***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Emissions pt change 0.089** 0.089**
(0.039) (0.038)
∆ Regional Exposure 0.003** 0.002 0.003** 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
∆ Industry Exposure 0.111*** -0.002 0.113*** 0.000
(0.036) (0.110) (0.036) (0.110)
R-Squared 0.647 0.646 0.647 0.647
Observations 22233 22231 22220 22218
Percentiles
∆ Regional Exposure
10th 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
90th 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
∆ Industry Exposure
10th 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
90th 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
All regressions include two digit NAICS industry fixed effects, Census division fixed
effects, and chemical fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and
are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.5: Source reduction activities
Dependent variable
(2010)
I.Source
reduc-
tion (0/1)
(OLS)
II.Source
reduc-
tion (0/1)
(2SLS)
III.Source
reduction
(0/1) with
scale (OLS)
IV.Source
reduc-
tion (0/1)
with scale
(2SLS)
SR (0/1) 2000 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.212*** 0.212***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Emissions pt change -0.015** -0.015**
(0.007) (0.008)
∆ Regional Exposure 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
∆ Industry Exposure 0.171* 0.167 0.210** 0.168
(0.087) (0.150) (0.104) (0.170)
R-Squared 0.119 0.118 0.121 0.120
Observations 26776 26774 23078 23076
Percentiles
∆ Regional Exposure
10th 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.009)
90th 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009)
∆ Industry Exposure
10th 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
90th 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
All regressions include two digit NAICS industry fixed effects, Census division fixed
effects, and chemical fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and
are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.6: Source reduction activities
Dependent variable I.Source
reduction
number
(OLS)
II.Source
reduction
number
(2SLS)
III.Source
reduction
number
(with scale)
(OLS)
IV.Source
reduction
number
(with scale)
(2SLS)
Number SR 2000 0.198*** 0.198*** 0.195*** 0.195***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Emissions pt change -0.023** -0.024**
(0.010) (0.010)
∆ Regional Exposure 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
∆ Industry Exposure 0.223* 0.248 0.275* 0.273
(0.118) (0.254) (0.137) (0.288)
R-Squared 0.111 0.111 0.114 0.113
Observations 26776 26774 23078 23076
Percentiles
∆ Regional Exposure
10th 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.013)
90th 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.012)
∆ Industry Exposure
10th 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011)
90th 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011)
All regressions include two digit NAICS industry fixed effects, Census division fixed
effects, and chemical fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and
are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7: Selection of Facilities - Release and Recycle
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Facility Survival Facility Survival Facility Survival Facility Survival
dummy (LPM) dummy (2SLS) dummy (LPM) dummy (2SLS)
Envi. Behavior % Release % Release % Recycled % Recycled
Y2000 -0.071*** -0.097*** 0.071*** 0.052***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
∆ IPrf -0.026 -0.003 -0.008 0.007
(Reg. Exposure) (0.015) (0.027) (0.013) (0.017)
∆ IPi -0.351*** -1.160*** -0.391*** -0.946***
(Ind. Exposure) (0.042) (0.278) (0.034) (0.194)
∆ IPr × Y 2000 0.014 -0.012 -0.040* -0.057**
(0.021) (0.035) (0.020) (0.022)
∆ IPi × Y 2000 -0.076 0.831*** 0.026 0.632***
(0.098) (0.298) (0.117) (0.216)
Emissions2000 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.093 0.088 0.091 0.087
Observations 50380 50373 50380 50373
All regressions include two digit NAICS industry fixed effects, Census division fixed effects,
and chemical fixed effects. Y represents a measure of dirtiness. Envi, Reg, and Ind denote
Environmental, Regional, and Industry respectively.Standard errors are clustered at the state
level and are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.8: Selection of Facilities - Source Reduction Activities
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Facility Survival Facility Survival Facility Survival Facility Survival
dummy (LPM) dummy (2SLS) dummy (LPM) dummy (2SLS)
Envi. Behavior SR (0/1) SR (0/1) SR (#) SR (#)
Y2000 0.047*** 0.032* 0.031*** 0.025***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009)
∆ IPr -0.003 0.006 -0.004 0.005
(Reg. Exposure) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
∆ IPi -0.353*** -0.876*** -0.355*** -0.847***
(Ind. Exposure) (0.040) (0.166) (0.041) (0.156)
∆ IPr × Y 2000 -0.052*** -0.062*** -0.034*** -0.038***
(0.022) (0.024) (0.011) (0.012)
∆ IPi × Y 2000 -0.048 0.459** -0.023 0.198**
(0.121) (0.213) (0.037) (0.095)
Emissions2000 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.081 0.076 0.081 0.077
Observations 60723 60716 60723 60716
All regressions include two digit NAICS industry fixed effects, Census division fixed effects,
and chemical fixed effects. Y represents a measure of dirtiness. Envi, Reg, and Ind denote
Environmental, Regional, and Industry respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level and are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 2.9: Marginal effects - Industry Exposure
Recycle
Industry Exposure
10th percentile
(Less Exposed)
90th percentile
(More exposed)
10th percentile (Dirty facility) 0.465*** 0.436***
(0.003) (0.007)
90th percentile (Clean facility) 0.525*** 0.498***
(0.003) (0.007)
Table 2.10: Marginal effects - Industry Exposure - 2SLS
Recycle
Industry Exposure
10th percentile
(Less Exposed)
90th percentile
(More exposed)
10th percentile (Dirty facility) 0.483*** 0.412***
(0.003) (0.007)
90th percentile (Clean facility) 0.520*** 0.496***
(0.003) (0.007)
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Table 2.11: Marginal effects - Regional Exposure
Recycle
Regional Exposure
10th percentile
(Less Exposed)
90th percentile
(More exposed)
10th percentile (Dirty facility) 0.453*** 0.450***
(0.003) (0.007)
90th percentile (Clean facility) 0.522*** 0.503***
(0.003) (0.007)
Table 2.12: Marginal effects - Regional Exposure - 2SLS
Recycle
Regional Exposure
10th percentile
(Less Exposed)
90th percentile
(More exposed)
10th percentile (Dirty facility) 0.449*** 0.452***
(0.003) (0.007)
90th percentile (Clean facility) 0.519*** 0.499***
(0.003) (0.007)
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: Share of US imports from China and import penetration
1998-2012
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Figure 2.2: Change in Regional Exposure to Import Competition 2000
to 2010
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Chapter 3 Facilities’ Environmental behavior and Environmental Justice
Efforts at the Federal Level
This paper empirically explores a possible link between the environmental
justice efforts during the Obama administration and the change in environmental
inequity by examining the change in US facilities’ underlying environmental behavior,
focusing on the period at the beginning of Obama administration (2009) and towards
the end of the administration (2016). I find that even though environmental inequity
existed in both years, there is evidence of reduction in environmental inequity from
2009 to 2016. Specifically, facilities seem to make cleaner environmental decisions
with respect to their share of emissions released/recycled, source reduction activities,
and exit/entry in high-minority, low-income counties during this period. Although
no causality can be inferred, this study suggests a positive correlation between the
environmental justice efforts by the Obama administration and reduction in environ-
mental inequity from 2009 to 2016 in terms of facilities’ environmental behavior. It
also points out the dearth of data and the need for further research that could help
establish a causal relationship between EJ efforts by the Obama administration and
the reduction of environmental injustice.
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3.1 Introduction
The US Environmental Protection Agency defines environmental justice (EJ)
as “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race,
color, national origin, or income, with respect to the development, implementation,
and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”1 Fair treatment
means that “no group of people should bear a disproportionate share of the negative
environmental consequences resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial
operations or policies.”2 For this article, I focus on the “fair treatment” aspect of the
definition of environmental justice. In this respect, environmental injustice relates to
the idea that environmental hazards are disproportionately distributed along racial,
ethnic, and income differences. Particularly, I focus on estimating disproportionate
distributive impact of environmental decisions of US facilities with respect to their
chemical waste management activities on counties with high-minority and low-income
populations from 2009 to 2016, the period of Obama administration.
The environmental justice movement was recognized at the federal level in
1994 with the signing of the Executive Order (hereafter EO) 12898 “Federal Actions to
Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations”
by President Bill Clinton. However, Salcido (2016) notes that although the EO was
successful in building the foundation, very little progress was made until the advent
of Obama administration, under which EPA issued Plan EJ 2014 in September 2011.
The plan was a comprehensive “roadmap for integrating environmental justice into its
[EPA’s] programs, policies, and activities.” The 2013 progress report on Plan EJ 2014
proudly mentions a drastic increase in the number of environmental justice analyses of
EPA rules conducted in 2010-2011. For instance, while from 1995 to 2009 there were
less than two EJ analyses on average per year, there were more than 20 EJ analyses per
year on average from 2010 to 2012. However, despite these indications of progress in
identifying and addressing EJ concerns, it is unclear how the Obama administration’s
wide-ranging efforts directed at addressing EJ actually influenced the disproportionate
distribution of environmental hazards among various groups. The present study takes
up the question of such a possible interaction between the administration’s efforts to
advance EJ goals on the one hand, and the distributive effects of chemical emissions
as measured by the disproportionate impact of facilities’ environmental decisions-with
1See https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/learn-about-environmental-justice.
2See https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/learn-about-environmental-justice.
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respect to the release and recycling of chemical emissions-on minority and low-income
communities, on the other. This is the first study, to the best of my knowledge, that
attempts to look at the connection between efforts addressing environmental justice
during Obama administration and the state of environmental inequity, as depicted
by the impact of facilities’ environmental behavior in high-minority, low-income
neighborhoods.
It should be noted, however, that teasing out the causal effect in this inter-
action is challenging for several reasons. First, finding an appropriate instrument that
would be exogenous to the model is not feasible. Second, selecting a comparison group
is difficult since we cannot designate counties or facilities as “treated,” the treatment
being the efforts or rulemakings addressing EJ during Obama administration. Third,
there is paucity of data pertaining to the EPA rulemakings and other efforts addressing
environmental justice issues under Obama administration. Hence, in this paper, I
look for the change in disproportionate impact of environmental activities by facilities,
focusing on the period at the beginning of Obama administration (2009) and towards
the end of the administration (2016).
The approach of this paper resembles that of Arora and Cason (1999),
especially with reference to the type of pollution studied3. Controlling for zip code
demographic and economic characteristics in 1990, Arora and Cason (1999) perform
national as well as regional analysis to evaluate releases from facilities that reported
to TRI in 1993. They provide evidence of environmental inequity, with race4 being
an important factor in determining the releases after controlling for economic and
collective action variables, especially in the non-urban areas in the South. Consistent
with Arora and Cason (1999), I find evidence of environmental inequity. However, I
find that environmental inequity decreases from 2009 to 2016. I focus on this time
period−2009 to 2016−to assess the possible impact of environmental justice efforts
under Obama administration. Moreover, whereas the geographical unit of analysis for
Arora and Cason (1999) was zip code, I perform a county level analysis since it is the
lowest geographical scale for which ACS 1-year estimates are available. I also examine
facilities’ entry and exit behavior in comparing the intensity of environmental inequity
in 2009 and 2016. In addition, previous studies on environmental inequity (for example,
3Some other papers that study a similar type of pollution are Brooks and Sethi (1997), Ringquist
(1997), Daniels and Friedman (1999), and Perlin et al. (1995).
4Arora and Cason (1999) find that zip codes with larger share of nonwhite population experienced
higher amount of toxic releases from TRI facilities
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Perlin et al. (1995)) using data on TRI facilities have mainly focused on absolute
amount of facilities pollution emissions that are largely a function of production scale.
However, in this study, I primarily examine underlying environmental behavior of a
facility by looking at its share of emissions released (or disposed of)/recycled and its
source reduction activities.
While previous studies on the impact of environmental hazards have focused
on low-income and high-minority neighborhoods, they have differed in how they
defined these affected groups (Shadbegian and Wolverton, 2015). In this paper, I
define minority as the percentage of nonwhite population or Hispanic population
in a county and low-income counties as those with low median household income.
I examine a typical facility’s environmental behavior in US counties from 2009 to
2016 (the period marking the Obama administration) to evaluate if the high-minority,
low-income counties were treated any more fairly in 2016 than in 2009. To this end,
I analyze the data on emissions released/recycled and source reduction activities of
facilities that report to the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory program and the data on
county demographic and socioeconomic characteristics from the American Community
Survey 1-year estimates.
I run a cross sectional analysis for 2009 and 2016, controlling for several
confounding factors such as chemical toxicity5 (by including chemical fixed effects),
state wide regulations (by including state fixed effects) and share of labor force in an
industry6 (by including industry fixed effects).7 I find that a county’s share of non-
white population/Hispanic population, and median household income are important
determinants of facilities’ environmental activities.
The results, overall suggest that a typical facility’s behavior with respect
to its environmental activities was more fair towards the high-minority, low-income
counties in 2016 than in 2009, although environmental inequity persisted. Specifically,
while in 2009 a typical facility released 5 percentage points more of its emissions
in a high-nonwhite, low-income county than a low-minority, high income county, in
2016, the corresponding number was 0.7 percentage point. In addition, a typical
facility released 10.6 percentage points more of its emissions in a high-Hispanic, low
5Brooks and Sethi (1997) control for chemical toxicity to better measure the exposure to air
toxics.
6Anderton et al. (1994) found percentage of population in manufacturing industry to be a
significant determinant of location of waste facilities.
7I added various other controls used in previous literature but the results stay mostly unchanged
(for robustness checks see Section 3.5).
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income county than in a low-minority, high income county in 2009. However, the
corresponding difference was 12.2 percentage points, suggesting that a facility was
treating a high-Hispanic, low-income county less fairly in 2016 when compared to 2009
with respect to its percent of its emissions released.
In terms of share of emissions recycled, in 2009 a facility recycled 7 percentage
points less in a high-nonwhite, low-income county than in a low-minority, high income
county, but in 2016 this measure was 5.4 percentage points. Similarly, whereas a facility
recycled 5 percentage points less in a high-Hispanic, low-income county than in a low-
minority, high income county, the corresponding measure in 2016 was 09 percentage
points, indicating a facility’s better treatment of a high-nonwhite, low-income county
and a high-Hispanic, low-income county in 2016 relative to 2009.
With respect to source reduction activities, while in 2009, a facility was 4.7
percentage points less likely to conduct source reduction activities in a high-nonwhite,
low-income than in a low-minority, high income county, in 2016, this corresponding
number was only 1.6 percentage points. Additionally, whereas in 2009, a facility’s
probability of conducting source reduction activities was 5 percentage points less in a
high-nonwhite, low-income than in a low-minority, high income county, in 2016, this
corresponding number was only 0.9 percentage points.
In addition, this article looks at exit8 and entry9 behavior for clean and
dirty facilities during the period, 2010 to 2016. This study uses a novel approach to
examine exit/entry behavior of facilities. I hypothesize that if efforts during Obama
administration were successful in reducing environmental injustice, we would expect
dirty facilities to be relatively less likely and clean facilities to be relatively more likely
to survive in counties with high-minority and low-income populations at the end of the
administration when compared to the situation at the beginning of the administration.
Similarly, we would anticipate dirty facilities to be less likely than clean facilities to
enter the high-minority and low-income county in 2016 as opposed to 2009.
I control for 2009 county demographic and economic characteristics and
examine the state of environmental inequity by evaluating a facility’s exit decisions
between 2010 and 2016. I find that a dirty facility is 5 percentage points more likely
8As in chapter 2, facility exit takes a broad definition denoting not just the shutting down
of facilities but also its exiting the industry, stopping the production of chemical or reducing the
production of chemicals to below threshold value for reporting.
9The facility entry takes a broader definition of not just siting itself in a location but also entering
a new industry, starting production of a new chemical, or increasing the production of a chemical to
above the threshold required for reporting.
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to exit during the period 2010 to 2016 than a clean facility from a high-nonwhite,
low-income county. Similarly, a dirty facility is 1 percentage point more likely to exit
from a high-Hispanic, low-income county than a clean facility. Also, a dirty facility is
5 percentage points more likely to exit from a high-nonwhite, low-income county than
a low-minority, high income county.
With regard to facility entry, controlling for 2016 county demographic and
economic characteristics, a dirty facility is 9 percentage points less likely to enter
between 2010 and 2016 in a high-nonwhite, low-income county and 0.3 percentage
points less likely to enter in high-Hispanic, low-income county than in a high-minority,
low-income county. This suggests that facilities were making positive environmental
decisions in a high-nonwhite, low-income county as well as in a high-Hispanic, low-
income county. In terms of facility’s exit/entry, thus, there seems to be a little evidence
suggesting that facilities’ exit/entry behavior might have contributed to the reduction
in facilities disparate behavior (that is, environmental inequity) towards the end of
Obama administration.
However, in the absence of a counterfactual, that is, the impact of facilities’
behavior from 2009 to 2016 if there were no EJ efforts by the Obama administration, it
is hard to know how much reduction in the environmental inequity can be attributed
to the administration. But there seems to be a positive correlation between the EJ
efforts by the Obama administration and reduction in environmental inequity.
This paper is organized into following s: Section 3.2 discusses the background
on environmental justice and federal efforts in addressing environmental justice. Section
3.3 describes the data and Section 3.4 presents the methodology and results. Finally,
3.5 provides specification checks and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background
Historically, the environmental justice movement could be seen as arising
from the grassroots activism of 1960s, 70s, and 80s.10 However, the event that brought
the movement to national recognition was the widespread protests in 1982. The
protests brought together environmental and civil rights activists to oppose the siting
of a toxic landfill (that contained polychlorinated biphenyl, or PCB, an extremely toxic
chemical) in Warren county, North Carolina, an area with a predominantly low-income
10Cole and Foster (2001) provide an overview of grassroots level movements that contributed to
the environmental justice movement.
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and high-minority population. As the environmental justice movement began to gain
momentum in the 1980s, academic literature11 on environmental inequity also began
to emerge.
The initial studies on environmental justice point to a strong correlation
between pollution and race/income (Office, 1983; UCC, 1987), with the main focus
on examining disproportionate siting of commercial hazardous waste facilities. Some
subsequent studies confirmed such correlations, while others found mixed results.
For instance, twenty years after its initial report in 1987, United Church of Christ
(UCC) performed a similar analysis (Bullard et al., 2007) and found the pattern of
disproportionate siting to be persistent. Controlling for relative chemical toxicity
and atmospheric dispersion using Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators data from
EPA, Ash and Fetter (2004) find that communities that have a high proportion of
low-income and minority population are more likely to be exposed to air pollution
by toxic facilities. On the other hand, some studies found race to be no longer a
significant determinant of an environmental outcome12 when they controlled for a
variety of factors such as percentage of population in manufacturing occupations
(Anderton et al., 1994), industrial location factors (Kriesel et al., 1996)13 and land
and labor costs (Wolverton, 2009).14 Noting that many previous national level studies
on environmental injustice failed to properly control for proximity between the facility
site and neighborhood residential populations, Mohai and Saha (2006) use spatial
methods to better account for proximity and find stronger racial disparity around
hazardous waste facilities sites than that found in previous studies.
3.2.1 Environmental Justice in the Federal Government
While the environmental justice movement was present at the grassroots
level since 1960’s, it was recognized at the federal level in 1994 when President
Bill Clinton signed the Executive Order (EO) 12898 “Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations EO12898
(1994).” The order directed federal agencies to make achieving environmental justice
11For a comprehensive review of studies on environmental justice, see (Banzhaf et al., 2019b).
12Some of the reasons for these mixed results might include the following: (1) differences in types
of pollution studied (for instance, exposure to Treatment Storage and Disposal Facilities (TSDFs) or
polluting TRI facilities, (2) differences in the way exposed population is defined (3) differences in
geographic scope and spatial scale (Banzhaf et al., 2019a).
13This study was in the context of polluting TRI facilities.
14This study was in the context of polluting TRI facilities.
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part of their missions. The goal was to be achieved by “identifying and addressing,
as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income
populations...” The EO 12898 has been touted as one of the most important actions
in recognizing environmental injustice by the federal government. The then EPA
administrator, Carol Browner, noted its significance: “For too long, low-income
communities and minority communities have borne a disproportionate burden of
modern industrial life. Today’s Executive Order seeks to bring justice to these
communities.” The EO also created an Interagency Working Group on Environmental
Justice consisting of heads of various federal agencies. Some of the tasks15 of this
Working Group included providing advice to federal agencies on identifying unfair
impact on minority and low-income population and helping with collection of data and
research on environmental injustice. Although the EO was significant in building the
foundation, there was almost no progress made in its implementation during George
W. Bush administration (Salcido, 2016).
3.2.2 Obama administration and Environmental Justice
During his presidential campaign, Barack Obama emphasized environmental
justice to be one of his priorities when elected. Indeed, soon after he became the
president, he appointed Lisa Jackson16, who had been actively pursuing environmental
15The seven tasks were: “(1) provide guidance to Federal agencies on criteria for identifying
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority populations
and low-income populations; (2) coordinate with, provide guidance to, and serve as a clearinghouse
for, each federal agency as it develops an environmental justice strategy as required by section 1103
of this order, in order to ensure that the administration, interpretation and enforcement of programs,
activities and policies are undertaken in a consistent manner; (3) assist in coordinating research by,
and stimulating cooperation among, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health
and Human Services, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, a the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, and other agencies conducting research or other activities in accordance with
section 33 of this order; (4) assist in coordinating data collection, required by this order; (5) examine
existing data and studies on environmental justice; (6) hold public meetings as required in section
5502(d) of this order; and (7) develop interagency model projects on environmental justice that
evidence cooperation among Federal agencies.”
16Later in 2012, in his statement praising Lisa Jackson, he said “Under her leadership, the EPA
has taken sensible and important steps to protect the air we breathe and the water we drink, including
implementing the first national standard for harmful mercury pollution, taking important action
to combat climate change under the Clean Air Act, and playing a key role in establishing historic
fuel economy standards that will save the average American family thousands of dollars at the
pump, while also slashing carbon pollution.” See https://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/
epa-administrator-lisa-jackson-resigns-085530.
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justice issues since 1970s17, to lead the EPA.
One of her early efforts includes the release of a memorandum, in 2010, listing
seven key areas of focus, including environmentalism and environmental justice.18
This agential priority of environmental justice was stressed in 2011-2015 strategic plan
issued in September 2010.19 In order to execute this priority, EPA issued Plan EJ
2014 in September 2011 (USEPA, 2011). The plan was a comprehensive “roadmap for
integrating environmental justice into its [EPA’s] programs, policies, and activities.”
With this roadmap, the Obama administration was able to successfully revive the E.O.,
which was left inactive during the eight years of George W. Bush’s administration
(Zokovitch Paben, 2016).
The Plan EJ 2014, named in recognition of President Clinton’s signing
of EO 12898 in 1994, comprised of nine implementation plans with specific goals,
strategies, deliverables, and milestones (USEPA, 2011). These implementation plans
were divided into three parts: cross-agency focus areas, tools development areas, and
program initiatives. The cross-agency focus areas consist of integrating environmental
decision making into rulemaking, considering environmental justice in issuing permits,
furthering environmental justice through compliance and enforcement, and enhancing
engagement of all federal agencies in implementing E.O. 12898 (Salcido, 2016). The
tools development areas include developing analytic tools in the areas of science, law,
information, and resources.20 Under program initiatives, new initiatives related to EJ
are to be added to existing EPA programs. Thus Plan EJ 2014 helped integrate EJ
broadly into the administration’s environment related policies and decisions.
17At the UC Santa Cruz College 10 Commencement address, Lisa Jackson noted that she became
“a full-fledged environmentalist after the Love Canal disaster discovered in the late 1970s when buried
toxic sludge began oozing into basements in Niagara Falls.” See https://news.ucsc.edu/2011/06/
jackson-commencement.html.
18Additionally, in July 2010, EPA issued the Interim Guidance on Considering Environmental
Justice During the Development of an Action to help incorporate EJ considerations into rulemaking
(USEPA, 2013).
19Also, in September 2010, the Obama administration reconvened the IWG which was initially
created by E.O. 12898 but was dormant for the past ten years. In December 2010, a White house
forum on environmental justice was convened with an aim to give voice to environmental justice
leaders to advance the awareness of environmental justice and at the same time, facilitate discussion
between policy makers and the public. The participants included six cabinet members comprising of
high level officials from federal agencies such as Department of Energy and Department of Justice
and over 100 community environmental justice leaders (see https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/blog/2010/12/20/a-promise-environmental-justice-all-americans). This forum was a
driver for the Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) on Environmental Justice and Executive order
12898 signed by several cabinet members and the White House in August 2011 (Salcido, 2016).
20For detailed information, see USEPA (2011).
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3.2.3 Obama Administration, Facilities’ Environmental Behavior, and
Environmental Justice
So what efforts, if any, during the Obama administration could prompt
a change in facilities’ environmental behavior based on community characteristics?
As mentioned, one of the cross-agency focus areas in Plan EJ 2014 was to advance
environmental justice through compliance and enforcement. A key activity in this area
was ensuring compliance at facilities that are located in and around overburdened21
communities, which would ideally result in a less disproportionate impact of facilities’
environmental decisions.
To ensure facility compliance, the EPA office of compliance and enforcement
assurance (OECA) worked together with facilities’ managers in identifying these
overburdened communities and enforced adequate actions. The plan also details other
approaches such as developing tools that would help track facilities located in and
around the disproportionately affected communities and would facilitate automated
reporting on reviews of enforcement cases addressing environmental justice issues.
These efforts at the federal level to advance environmental justice, particularly the
agency’s tracking of facilities for their performance with regard to EJ could have
discouraged facilities from releasing chemical wastes in overburdened areas. At
the same time, these efforts could have motivated the facilities to undertake more
environmentally sustainable activities (such as recycling) to maintain good reputation
among the community and stave off enforcement actions against them. Hence, if
the efforts addressing EJ during the administration were effective, it is reasonable to
expect facilities to release less and recycle more of chemical emissions in minority heavy
and low-income counties during, or at least by the end of, the Obama administration
when compared to the beginning of the administration.
In addition, this article looks at exit and entry behavior for clean and dirty
facilities at the beginning of Obama administration (that is, 2009) and towards the
end of the same (that is, 2016). If efforts during Obama administration were successful
21EPA defines overburdened community as “Minority, low-income, tribal, or indigenous popu-
lations or geographic locations in the United States that potentially experience disproportionate
environmental harms and risks. This disproportionality can be as a result of greater vulnerability to
environmental hazards, lack of opportunity for public participation, or other factors. Increased vulner-
ability may be attributable to an accumulation of negative or lack of positive environmental, health,
economic, or social conditions within these populations or places. The term describes situations where
multiple factors, including both environmental and socio-economic stressors, may act cumulatively
to affect health and the environment and contribute to persistent environmental health disparities.”
See EPA EJ 2020 Glossary at https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/ej-2020-glossary.
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in reducing environmental injustice, we would expect dirty facilities to be relatively
less likely and clean facilities to be relatively more likely to survive in counties with
high minority and poor (low-income) populations at the end of the administration
when compared to the situation at the beginning of the administration.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Environmental Data
The data for facilities’ emissions releases/recycled, and source reduction
activities from 2009 to 2016 come from Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) provided by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This data is explained in detail in Chapter
1.
3.3.2 Demographic and Socioeconomic Data
US county data on race, education, housing, poverty status, unemployment
rate, median household income, hispanic population, total population, civilian labor
force commuting by public transportation (excluding taxicab), civilian labor force
employed in manufacturing, civilian labor force commuting by carpooling, population
that is foreign born (by place of birth), population employed in labor force, total
housing units, occupied housing units, renter occupied housing units, and median
value of owner-occupied units, from 2009 to 2016 are obtained from the American
Community Survey 1-year estimates from the US Census Bureau. These estimates
are for counties with population of more than 65,000.
In the ACS, there are five main race categories: White, Black or African
American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, and Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander. To obtain the percentage of nonwhite population, I summed up
the percentage of population that is Black or African American, American Indian or
Alaska Native, Asian, and Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander. For detailed
information on ACS data and construction of variables, the reader is referred to the
data appendix.
The final dataset is obtained by merging the TRI data from 2009 to 2016 at
the facility-chemical- NAICS 6-digit industry level with the county level data from ACS
1-year estimates from 2009 to 2016. While in 2009, 21,918 facilities reported emissions
of 487 different chemicals, in 2016 the number of facilities and chemicals reported
50
to the TRI were 21,881 and 502 respectively. Table 3.1 provides the descriptive
statistics for facilities’ environmental activities as well as county demographic and
socioeconomics characteristics for 2009 and 2016.
3.4 Empirics and Results
3.4.1 Empirics - Cross section 2009 and 2016
To examine a typical facility’s environmental behavior in a low-income, high-
minority county and in a high-income, low-minority county at the beginning and the
end of the Obama administration, I estimate the following cross sectional model for
2009 and 2016.
Yfciu = β0+β1pctNonwhiteu+β2pctHispanicu+β3MedHHincu+αs+αc+αn+εfciu
(3.4.1)
where Yfciu is the environmental activity of facility f, for chemical c, in county u, and
in 6-digit NAICS industry i. Environmental activities are: percentage of emissions (of
chemical c) released/recycled and a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a facility
conducts a source reduction activity and 0 otherwise. For this study, I focus on these
facilities’ underlying environmental activities as opposed to absolute emissions that
depend on production scale. The variable pctNonwhiteu is the percentage of nonwhite
or minority population, pctHispanicu is the percentage of Hispanic population, and
MedHHincu is the median Household Income (in 10 k$US) in a county u. αc are the
chemical fixed effects that control for unobservable factors that vary across chemicals
such as toxicity. αs are the state fixed effects that control for factors such as total
population that differs across states, and αn are two-digit NAICS industry fixed effects,
that control for aspects such as industry size that varies across the industries but not
much over time. The unit of observation is facility-chemical-industry (6-digit) pair in
a county.
It is to be noted that the variable pctNonwhiteu includes the respondents
who identified their origin as Hispanic. For instance, people who are included in the
race category of Black/African American could be of either Hispanic or non-Hispanic
origin. Conditioning on the share of Hispanic population helps hold the Hispanic
portion of pctNonwhiteu constant so that the parameter estimate of pctNonwhiteu,
β1, denotes the effect of non-Hispanic non-white population.
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3.4.1.1 Results - Cross section 2009 and 2016
I estimate equation 3.4.1 using an ordinary least squares (hereafter OLS)
with high dimensional fixed effects for years 2009 and 2016. Table 3.3 reports these
cross sectional results. The top panel displays the coefficient estimates and the bottom
panel reports the predictive margins.
Looking at the coefficient estimates of pctNonwhiteu in 2009, on average,
ceteris paribus, a ten percentage points increase in the percentage of a county’s
nonwhite population led to a decline of 0.31 percentage point in a facility’s share of
emissions released, a decrease of around 0.7 percentage point in a facility’s share of
emissions recycled, and reduced the likelihood that a facility would conduct source
reduction activities22 by 3.1 percent. These estimates are statistically significant. The
corresponding coefficient estimates of pctNonwhiteu for 2016 suggest that, on average,
a ten percentage points increase in the percentage of a county’s nonwhite population
led to a decrease of 0.25 percentage points in a facility’s share of emissions released
(although this is not statistically significant), a decrease of around 0.7 percentage
point in a facility’s share of emissions recycled, and reduction of 1.5 percent in the
probability that a facility would conduct source reduction activities, holding all other
variables constant. These estimates indicate that a county’s percentage of nonwhite
population was a significant determinant of facility’s underlying behavior with respect
to its environmental activities in 2009 but not so much in 2016.
Now turning to the estimates of pctHispanicu, in 2009, ceteris paribus, a
ten percentage points increase in the share of Hispanic population led to an increase
of 0.70 percentage point in a facility’s share of emissions released, a decrease of 0.37
percentage points in a facility’s share of emissions recycled, and a decrease of 3.2
percent in a facility’s likelihood of conducting source reduction activities. In 2016, if a
county’s share of Hispanic population increased by ten percentage points, on average,
a facility increased its share of emissions released by 1.34 percentage points, reduced
its share of emissions recycled by 0.4, and increased its likelihood of conducting source
reduction activities by 0.5 percent.
Now we move to the coefficient estimates of MedHHincu. In 2009, if a
22Note that for the observations for which the source reduction activity was missing, the dummy
for source reduction activities was assigned a value of 0. But for share of emissions released/recycled,
the observations with missing values are treated as missing. Hence we see that the regressions
when the dependent variable is the likelihood of conducting source reduction activities have more
observations than the ones for share of emissions released/recycled.
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county’s median household income increased by 10 k$US, a facility reduced its share
of emissions released by around 2 percent, increased its share of emissions recycled
by 0.6 percent, and increased its likelihood of conducting source reduction activities
by 0.6 percent. In 2016, a 10 k$US increase in median household income led to a
decrease of around 1 percent in a facility’s share of emissions released, increase of 0.2
percent in a facility’s share of emissions recycled, and an increase of 0.2 percent in
the likelihood that a facility conducted source reduction activities. The statistical
significance of the results above suggests that percentage of Hispanic population and
median household income in a county might be important determinants of a facility’s
decisions on its environmental activities in 2009 as well as in 2016.23 However, only
the differences in the coefficient estimates of MedHHinc between 2009 and 2016 are
statistically significant, as explained below.
I performed t-tests to check if the coefficient estimates of independent vari-
ables in 2009 are statistically different from those in 2016. Whereas for pctNonwhite
and pctHispanic, there is no statistically significant difference between their coefficient
estimates in 2009 and 2016, the difference between the estimates of MedHHinc in 2009
and 2016 is statistically significantly different from zero. This suggests that the effect
of a one unit increase in county’s median household income in 2016 was significantly
lower than its effect in 2009, thereby indicating a decrease in environmental equity in
2016 when compared to 2009.
Hence, overall, we see an evidence of a general presence of environmental
inequity in both 2009 and 2016. An increase in a county’s share of nonwhite and
Hispanic population led to a typical facility making less clean decisions (such as
decreasing its share of emissions recycled), and an increase in a county’s median
household income led to a facility making cleaner decisions (such as decreasing its
share of emissions released and increasing its share of emissions recycled). However,
there seems to be less environmental inequity in 2016 when compared to 2009, at least
with respect to a county’s median household income. In other words, a low-income
county is less likely to experience disparate impact of a facility’s behavior in terms of
its environmental activities in 2016 as opposed to 2009.
While the coefficients tell us about a typical facility’s environmental behavior
in an average county, to get a better sense of the state of environmental inequity in
23The only case where we see the estimates percentage of Hispanic population and median
household income not being statistically significant is when the dependent variable is facility’s
likelihood of conducting source reduction activities in 2016.
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2009 and 2016, it is more appropriate to look at how a typical facility behaves in
(1) High Nonwhite, low-income counties, and (2) high-Hispanic, low-income counties
(3) low-minority, high-income counties (4) A county that lies at the median in terms
of share of Nonwhite population and Hispanic population, and income. For better
illustration, I report the predictive margins for these counties taking specific counties
as examples (characteristics of which are also presented in Table 3.2):
(1) Apache county in Arizona, which is a high nonwhite, low-income county where,
in 2009, 74% of the total population was nonwhite (predominantly American Indi-
an/Alaskan). This county lies above 99 percentile of the share of nonwhite population
in the sample, and is also below 1 percentile of median household income with its
median household income being 26.4 k$US. With respect to the share of Hispanic
population, this county lies around the median with around 6 percent of its population
being Hispanic.24
(2) El Paso county in Texas, which is a high-Hispanic, low-income county where, in
2009, 82% of its population was Hispanic and its median household income was 36
k$US. In terms of the share of Hispanic population, this county lies above 99 percentile
and in terms of median household income, it is at around 3rd percentile. With respect
to its share of nonwhite population, it lies at around 13th percentile with 5% of its
population being nonwhite.25
(3) Merrimack county in New Hampshire, which is a low-minority, high-income county.
Specifically, in 2009, its share of nonwhite population was 2 percent, which was around
3rd percentile of proportion of nonwhite population for all counties. This county is at
around 85th percentile of median household income with a value of 63 k$US. Also, with
its share of Hispanic population of 1.5 percent, this county is at around 7th percentile
of the proportion of Hispanic population.26
24We see similar demographic and economic characteristics for Apache county in 2016. In
particular, its share of nonwhite population was 74% (which was again above 99 percentile), its share
of Hispanic population was 6 percent (which was around 40 percentile of share of Hispanic population
in all counties) and its median income was 34.7 k$US, which was again below 1 percentile of median
household income for all counties.
25Similarly, in 2016, of El Paso’s total population, Hispanic population and nonwhite population
accounted for 82.2% and 5.5% respectively. Thus the county was above 99 percentile and at 14th
percentile with respect to the share of Hispanic population and nonwhite population respectively. In
addition, this county’s median household income was 42.2 k$US, placing the county at 5th percentile.
26Similarly, in 2016, 3 percent of Merrimack county’s total population was nonwhite (which
is below 5 percentile of share of nonwhite population in all counties) and around 2 percent of its
population was Hispanic (which is around 5 percentile of share of Hispanic population for all counties).
The median household income in this county was 69.5 k$US, hence the county was at around 83rd
percentile in this regard.
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(4) For a median county, that is, a county which is at 50th percentile in terms of share
of nonwhite and Hispanic population, and median household income, 16% and 7% of
its total population was nonwhite and Hispanic respectively in 2009. Additionally, its
median household income was 49 k$US. In 2016, this county’s share of nonwhite popu-
lation and Hispanic population were 17% and 8.5% of its total population respectively
and its median household income was 55.3 k$US.
Next, looking at the predictive margins in the second panel of Table 3.3, we
see that in 2009, while a typical facility released 49.6% of its emissions in Apache
county, it released 44.6% of its emissions in Merrimack county.27 In other words, a
facility released 5 percentage points more of its emissions in Apache county than in
Merrimack county in 2009. This difference is economically significant28 10% of the
mean. This suggests that a typical facility released a significantly higher share of its
emissions in a high nonwhite, low-income county than in a low-minority, high-income
county. Hence, this provides evidence of the existence of environmental inequity in
2009. However, in 2016, a facility’s share of emissions released in Apache county was
only 0.7 (which is 1% of the mean) percentage points higher than that in Merrimack
county. Hence, it shows a significant reduction in environmental inequity in 2016
compared to 2009. Comparing a high-Hispanic, low-income county to a low-minority,
high-income county, we see that in 2009, whereas a typical facility released 55.2
percent of emissions in El Paso county, it released 44.6 percent of its emissions in
Merrimack county, which suggests that a facility released 10.6 percentage points more
of emissions in El Paso county than in Merrimack county. In 2016, this difference
was 12.2 percentage points, indicating an increase in environmental inequity in 2016
compared to 2009.
With regards to facilities’ recycling behavior, in 2009, whereas a typical
facility recycled around 20 percent of emissions in Apache county, it recycled around
27 percent of emissions in Merrimack county.29 This difference of 7 percentage points
between these counties is economically significant 30% of the mean. We see that
a typical facility recycled significantly lower share of emissions in a high-nonwhite,
low-income county than in a low-minority, high-income county in 2009. Hence, as
before, we see evidence of environmental injustice in 2009. But in 2016, the difference
27For reference, a median county released 47.2 percent and 44.3 percent of its emissions in 2009
and 2016 respectively.
28Note that this difference is statistically significant too.
29For reference, a median county recycled 24.8 percent and 26.5 percent of its emissions in 2009
and 2016 respectively.
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between Apache county and Merrimack county, with respect to a facility’s share of
emissions recycled, was 5.4 percentage points. This reduction in difference shows some
improvement in environmental inequity in 2016 when compared to 2009. Furthermore,
when comparing El Paso county and Merrimack county, we see that in 2009, a facility
recycled 22 percent of its emissions in El Paso county whereas it recycled 27 percent
of its emissions in Merrimack county, a difference of 5 percentage points. Hence, it
indicates environmental injustice in 2009. However, in 2016 this difference reduced
to 0.9 percentage points, suggesting an improvement in environmental inequity when
compared to 2009.
With regard to source reduction activities, while in 2009 a facility was 4.7
percentage points (which is economically significant 67% of the mean) less likely to
conduct source reduction activities in Apache county than in Merrimack county, in
2016 it was only 1.6 percentage points30 less likely to do so. Now comparing El Paso
county and Merrimack county, in 2009 a facility was 4.7 percent and 9 percent31 likely
to conduct source reduction activities in El Paso and Merrimack county respectively,
a difference of around 4 percentage points. However, this difference reduces to just
0.1 percentage point in 2016. Therefore, we see a similar pattern of reduction in
environmental inequity in 2016 compared to 2009 with respect to facilities’ conducting
source reduction activities.
One possible explanation for these reductions in environmental inequity are
the environmental justice efforts, by the Obama administration, related to ensuring
compliance and tracking of facilities for their performance in overburdened areas (as
discussed in section 3.2). It is possible that these efforts encouraged the facilities to
pollute less (or release less of its emissions) and to undertake more environmentally
sustainable activities such as recycling or source reducing the emissions.
Overall, these results illustrate how facilities’ environmental behavior appears
to be a significant contributor to increased environmental equity in 2016.
3.4.2 Empirics - Change in environmental activity from 2009 to 2016
From the cross sectional results, we see that, overall, environmental inequity
reduced in 2016 when compared to 2009 with respect to environmental behavior by
facilities. In the next specification, I attempt to delve a little deeper in examining
30This is 23% of the mean.
31For reference, a median county was 9 percent and 6.8 percent likely to conduct source reduction
activities in 2009 and 2016 respectively.
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facilities’ behavior in explaining this potential reduction in environmental inequity.
Accordingly, I focus on facilities that reported their emissions for a specific chemical
in both 2009 and 2016. The facilities that do not report a given chemical in either
2009 or 2016 will drop out from the sample (and hence the drop in observations in
this model as opposed to previous one).
Furthermore, an environmental hazard, such as a polluting facility, might
reduce the environmental quality in the nearby neighborhood and result in a reduction
of property values. People who have high willingness to pay for cleaner environment
might leave that neighborhood and people whose willingness to pay is low could move
in (Hamilton, 1995b). This mechanism is referred to as minority move-in hypothesis
(Pastor et al., 2001). Because of this sorting behavior, the demographic characteristics
can be endogenous to the environmental decisions of facilities in a given year. To
avoid this endogeneity,32 I use 2009 county demographic and economic characteristics
to explain the change in a facility’s environmental activities from 2009 to 2016. To
this end, I estimate the following model:
Y 2016fciu − Y 2009fciu = β0 + β1pctNonwhite2009u + β2pctHispanic2009u+
β3MedHHinc2009u + αs + αc + αn + εfciu (3.4.2)
where Y 2016fciu − Y 2009fciu is the change in a facility’s environmental
activity from 2009 to 2016. pctNonwhite2009u is the percentage of nonwhite or
minority population, pctHispanic2009u is the percentage of Hispanic population, and
MedHHinc2009u is the median Household Income (in 10 k$US) in a county u in
2009. αc,αs, and αn are chemical, state, and two-digit NAICS industry fixed effects,
respectively. The unit of observation is facility-chemical-industry (6-digit) pair in
county u.
3.4.2.1 Results - Change in environmental activity from 2009 to 2016
I estimate equation 3.4.2 using OLS with high dimensional fixed effects. Table
3.4 presents these results. As before, the top panel shows the coefficient estimates
and bottom panel shows the predictive margins for select counties. As the share of
nonwhite population in a county increased by ten percentage points in 2009, on average
a facility increased its share of emissions released by a statistically significant 0.35
32Arora and Cason (1999) discuss such an endogeneity issue. They use 1990 zipcode characteristics
to explain 1993 releases from US facilities.
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percentage points, decreased its share of emissions recycled by 0.02 percentage points
(although this is statistically insignificant), and reduced its likelihood of conducting
source reduction activities by 1.1 percent in 2016, holding all other variables constant.
If the share of Hispanic population in a county increased by ten percentage
points in 2009, on average a facility reduced its share of emissions released by 0.14
percentage point, reduced its share of emissions recycled by 0.20 percentage point
ceteris paribus, and increased its probability of conducting a source reduction activity
by 2.9 percent in 2016. In addition, when the median household income in a county
increased by 100 k$US, a facility reduced its share of emissions recycled by 0.3 percent
and its likelihood of conducting source reduction activities reduced by 5.1 percent.
While the proportion of nonwhite population seems to be a significant determinant of
changes in facilities’ share of emissions released, median household income seems to
affect the likelihood of conducting source reduction activities.
Although the above results give a sense of how, on average, a facility might
change its environmental behavior based on characteristics of an average county, I
am specifically interested in the impact in high-minority, low-income counties, and
in low-minority, high-income counties, as in the previous model. Looking at the
predictive margins, we see that going from 2009 to 2016, in Apache county, AZ, which
is a high nonwhite, low-income county, a typical facility increased its share of emissions
recycled by 0.4 percentage points, which is around 2% of the mean. In addition,
moving from 2009 to 2016, in El Paso county, a facility increased its share of emissions
recycled by 2 percentage points, which is economically significant33 9% of the mean.
In Merrimack county, a low-minority, high-income county, the increase was 0.4 percent
and statistically insignificant. For comparison, in a median county (that is, a county
that lies at the 50th percentile of: percent of nonwhite population, percent of Hispanic
population, and median household income), a facility increased its share of emissions
recycled by 0.5 percentage point. Similarly, going from 2009 to 2016, in Apache county
and El Paso county, we see an increase of 0.5% and 3% respectively in a facility’s
likelihood of conducting source reduction activities. However, in Merrimack county, a
low-minority, high-income county, a facility’s likelihood of conducting source reduction
activities reduced by 0.8%. In median county, on the other hand, there was no change
in a facility’s source reduction behavior. These predictions indicate that facilities
might be treating the counties with high-minority and low-income population more
33Note that this predictive margin is statistically significant too.
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fairly in 2016 than in 2009 by making cleaner decisions.
Against this general trend of more fairness in 2016, I also find that whereas
the percent of emissions released by a facility reduced by 1 percentage point in a
median county from 2009 to 2016, it increased by 0.9 percentage point in Apache
county, decreased by 2.5 percentage points in El Paso county, and decreased by 1.3
percentage points in Merrimack county. This indicates that while in both a high-
Hispanic, low-income county and a low-minority, high-income county, a facility makes
cleaner decisions going from 2009 to 2016, it makes dirtier decisions in a high-nonwhite,
low income county. Although these results suggest that in a high-Hispanic, low-income
county (such as El Paso) a facility made cleaner decisions in 2016 than 2009, with
respect to a high nonwhite, low-income county, we find mixed results.
Overall, therefore, when we restrict the facilities to those that reported their
chemical emissions to the TRI in 2009 as well as 2016, and control for 2009 county
demographic and economic characteristics, we see only some evidence that changes
in facilities’ environmental activities might have contributed to an improvement in
environmental equity in 2016, that is, towards the end of Obama administration.
3.4.3 Empirics: Facility exit
So far, the results indicate a reduction in environmental inequity in 2016 with
regard to facilities’ waste management activities. In this section, I explore another
channel through which we can examine environmental inequity: facilities’ exit decisions.
I evaluate how likely the facilities that reported their emissions for a given chemical
to the TRI in 2009 are to exit in 2016, that is, at the end of Obama administration.
Particularly, the question I am interested in is: Were the dirty facilities exiting more
(relative to the clean ones) in a low-income, high-minority county in 2016? If the
Environmental Justice efforts, such as stricter permitting processes, during the Obama
administration were successful in reducing environmental injustice, we would expect to
see a relatively higher exit rate of dirty facilities in low-income, high-minority counties.
I estimate the following linear probability model:
FacExit2016fciu = β0+β1Y 2009fciu+β2pctNonwhite2009u+β3pctHispanic2009u+
β4MedHHinc2009u + β5pctNonwhite2009u × Y 2009fciu+
β6pctHispanic2009u × Y 2009fciu + β7MedHHinc2009u × Y 2009fciu+
Emissions2009fciu + αs + αc + αn + εfciu (3.4.3)
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where FacExit2016fciu is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if facility
f in county u and in 6-digit NAICS industry i did not report TRI emissions of its
chemical c in 2016 (but did report in 2009) and 0 otherwise. It is to be noted that
facilities that did not report their chemical emissions to TRI in 2016 might have
stopped reporting (that is exited) anytime between 2010 and 2016 inclusive. As in
chapter 2, facility exit takes a broad definition denoting not just the shutting down
of a facility but also its exiting the industry, stopping the production of chemical or
reducing the production of chemicals to below threshold value for reporting. The unit
of observation is facility-chemical-industry (6-digit) pair in a county. Out of the 81239
facility-chemical-industry pairs present in 2009, 35115 exited in 2016, which is an exit
rate of 43.2%.
Again, pctNonwhite2009u, pctHispanic2009u, and MedHHinc2009u are
the percentage of nonwhite population, the percentage of Hispanic population, and
median Household Income (in 10 k$US) in county u in 2009. pctNonwhite2009u ×
Y 2009fciu is the interaction between percentage of minority population in a county and
facility’s environmental activity. This term would allow the effects of environmental
activity to vary by the proportion of minority population in a county. Similarly,
pctHispanic2009u × Y 2009fciu is the interaction between percentage of Hispanic
population in a county and facility’s environmental activity. And MedHHinc2009u ×
Y 2009fciu is the interaction between median household income in a county and facility’s
environmental activity. Emissions2009fciu denotes the total emissions of a facility.
As before, αc,αs, and αn are chemical, state, and two-digit NAICS industry fixed
effects, respectively.
3.4.3.1 Results - Facility exit
Table 3.5 reports the results from the estimation of equation 3.4.3. From
column (1) of table 3.5, we see that on average, a one percentage point increase in a
county’s share of nonwhite population in 2009 increased a facility’s likelihood of exit
by 2.8 percent, holding all other variables constant. Additionally, a 10 k$US increase
in median household income leads to an increase of 1.2 percent in the likelihood of
a facility’s exit. When looking at facility’s environmental activities of recycling and
source reduction in column (2) and (3) respectively, a county’s share of nonwhite and
Hispanic population, and median household income significantly impact the facility’s
exit behavior. In particular, the estimates suggest that, on average, as the percentage
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of nonwhite population or median household income increases, the facility is more
likely to exit whereas when the percentage of Hispanic population increases, the facility
is less likely to exit, ceteris paribus.
These results also tell us how facilities’ environmental activities could be
a possible determinant of its exit rate. If a facility increased its share of emissions
released by 1 percentage point in 2009, on average it was 9.3 percent more likely to
exit between 2010 and 2016, holding all other variables constant. In addition, a one
percentage point increase in a facility’s share of emissions recycled in 2009 led to a
reduction in the likelihood of facility’s exit by 0.5 percent. In the case of facility’s
source reduction activities, a similar pattern can be seen, with a corresponding decrease
in the facility’s exit of 3.8 percent. This suggests that a facility that makes dirtier
environmental decisions is more likely to exit. On the other hand, a facility that makes
cleaner decisions is less likely to exit between 2010 and 2016.
Looking at the interaction effects (column (1) of Table 3.5), the dirtier TRI
facilities are 4.9 percent more likely to exit from a county with high share of nonwhite
population and 5.4 percent less likely to exit from a county with high share of Hispanic
population. Also, they are more likely to exit from poor counties but (1.2 percent)
less likely to exit from rich counties.
These results show how an average facility’s exit rate might be affected in
an average county. To provide a better sense of these results (especially the estimates
of interaction terms) in the context of environmental justice, table 3.8 provides the
marginal predictions of exit rate for dirty and clean facilities in a high-minority,
low-income county (Apache county), a low-minority, high-income county (Merrimack
county), high-Hispanic, low-income county (El Paso county), and a median county. I
define dirty facility as a facility at the 90th percentile with respect to the percentage
of emissions released and clean facility as the one at the 10th percentile.
In a high-minority, low-income county, such as Apache County, a dirty facility
is 50.1 percent likely to exit whereas a clean facility is 40.6 percent likely. In other
words, although both dirty and clean facilities are likely to exit, a dirty facility is
around 10 percentage points more likely to exit than a clean facility in Apache county.34
Moreover, a dirty facility is 5 percentage points more likely to exit in Apache county
than it is in Merrimack county.35 In a high-Hispanic, low-income county, such as El
Paso county, a dirty facility is 38.5 percent likely to exit and a clean facility is 37.5
34This difference is statistically significant.
35This difference is statistically significant.
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percent likely to exit. Hence, in a high-Hispanic, low-income county, a dirty facility
is 1 percentage point more likely to exit than a clean facility. In a median county, a
dirty facility is 46 percent likely to exit whereas a clean facility is 42 percent likely.
One of the potential reasons for a facility’s exit in low-income and high-
minority counties could be the efforts to address environmental justice during the
Obama administration, especially those under Plan EJ2014 that aimed at ensuring
compliance by the facilities and undertaking enforcement activities. For instance,
as discussed in section 3.2, EPA office of compliance and enforcement assurance
(OECA) implemented program initiatives that took actions against facilities that
“emit excessive amounts of air toxics” (Plan EJ2014) in overburdened communities. As
noted earlier, Ash and Fetter (2004) found that communities with low-income and high
proportion of minority population face disproportionate exposure from TRI facilities.
Hence it seems reasonable to believe that these efforts by the Obama administration
might have encouraged the facilities to decrease their emissions to lower than threshold
(required for reporting to TRI) amounts, and hence these facility-chemical-industry
pairs might have exited between 2010 and 2016. It is also possible that such efforts
could have resulted in shutdown of dirty facilities. Thus, these results show that
facility’s exit behavior might have played a role in the increased environmental equity
in 2016.
3.4.4 Empirics: Facility entry
In this section, I explore another channel to evaluate environmental inequity:
facility’s entry behavior. One of the mechanisms that characterizes environmental
justice is the disparate siting decisions of polluting facilities (Banzhaf et al., 2019a).
Many studies have aimed to find evidence on such a behavior. For instance, Been
(1994), Pastor et al. (2001), and McCoy (2017) suggest that facilities tend to locate in
areas with disproportionate share of minority population. In this paper, I look at TRI
facilities entry decisions to decipher their siting behavior.
Furthermore, I examine how likely dirty and clean facilities are to enter in a
low-income, high-minority county and in a high-income, low-minority county between
2010 and 2016. If the Obama administration’s efforts towards EJ were successful in
reducing environmental injustice, we would anticipate a reduction in the entry rate
of dirty facilities and an increase in the entry rate of clean facilities in low-income,
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high-minority county. I estimate the following linear probability model:
FacEntry2016fciu = β0+β1Y 2016fciu+β2pctNonwhite2016u+β3pctHispanic2016u
+ β4MedHHinc2016u + β5pctNonwhite2016u × Y 2016fciu+
β6pctHispanic2016u × Y 2016fciu + β7MedHHinc2016u × Y 2016fciu+
Emissions2016fciu + αs + αc + αn + εfciu (3.4.4)
where FacEntry2016fciu is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a facility
f in county u and in 6-digit NAICS industry i reported its emissions for chemical c
to TRI in 2016 (but did not do so in 2009), and 0 otherwise. It is to be noted that
facilities that reported their emissions for a specific chemical to TRI in 2016 might
have started to report (that is they entered) anytime between 2010 and 2016. As in
the case of facility exit above, the facility entry takes a broader definition of not just
siting itself in a location but also entering a new industry, starting production of a new
chemical, or increasing the production of a chemical to above the threshold required
for reporting. On the right hand side of the equation, I have the same set of variables
as in equation 3.4.3 but for 2016. The rationale for using these 2016 measures is that a
facility’s entry decisions in the period after 2009 until 2016 are likely to be influenced
by demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of a county in 2016. The unit of
observation is facility-chemical-industry (6-digit) pair in a county. Out of the 79767
facility-chemical-industry pairs present in 2016, 33643 entered in 2016, representing
an entry rate of 42.2%.
3.4.4.1 Results - Facility entry
Next, I estimate equation 3.4.4 and the results are shown in table 3.7.
Looking at column (1), on average, a percentage point increase in a county’s
proportion of nonwhite population led to a decrease of 1.5 percent in the facility’s
likelihood of entry, holding all other variables constant. This effect decreased further as
a facility’s percentage of emissions released increased. A one percentage point increase
in a county’s percentage of Hispanic population led to a decrease of 14.5 percent
in the facility’s probability of entry. This impact increased by 15.1 percent as the
facility’s share of emissions released increased. On the other hand, a 10k $US increase
in median household income led to a 0.3 percent increase in facility’s likelihood of
entry.
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Next, as before, I examine how a facility’s environmental activity could
determine its entry rate. On average, holding everything else constant, if a facility
increased its share of emissions released by 1 percentage point, it was 4.7 percent
more likely to enter (column 1 of table 3.7. Similarly, a percentage point increase in a
facility’s share of emissions recycled led to an increase of 2.4 percent in the likelihood
of facility’s entry (column (2) of table 3.7).
Now looking at the interaction terms (in column (1) of Table 3.7), among
the TRI facilities, the dirtier facilities are 8.3 percent less likely to enter in a county
with high share of nonwhite population and are 15.8 percent more likely to enter in a
county with high share of Hispanic population. Additionally, dirtier facilities are more
likely to enter a poor county (that is, a county with low median household income).
Next I examine the entry behavior of dirty and clean facilities. Table 3.8
reports the marginal predictions of the likelihood of entry for dirty and clean facilities
in a low-income, high-minority county (Apache county), and in a high-income, low-
minority county (Merrimack county). The probability of entry for a dirty facility in
Apache county is 36 percent whereas that for a clean facility is 37 percent. That is, a
dirty facility is 1 percentage point less likely to enter than a clean facility in Apache
county. In Merrimack county, which is a low-minority, high-income county, a dirty
facility is 46 percent likely to enter and a clean facility is 42 percent likely to enter. In
El Paso county, whereas a dirty facility is 45 percent likely to enter, a clean facility is
only 29 percent likely to enter. In a median county, a dirty and a clean facility are 43
percent and 39 percent likely to enter, respectively.
In addition, a dirty facility is 9 percentage points36 less likely to enter in
Apache county and 0.3 percentage points37 less likely to enter in El Paso county than
in Merrimack county, which indicates facilities’ positive environmental decisions in
high-minority counties, thus contributing to less disparate behavior. However, a clean
facility is 4 and 13 percentage points less likely to enter Apache county and El Paso
county, respectively, than it is to enter Merrimack county.
As noted earlier, previous studies have found that facilities tend to locate
in neighborhoods with high proportion of minority population, an evidence of en-
vironmental inequity. One of the EJ efforts during Obama administration was to
encourage the integration of environmental justice concerns in the EPA permitting
process as well as permitting process at the state and local level. As a part of this effort,
36This difference is statistically significant.
37This difference is statistically insignificant.
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people in low-income, high-minority communities were encouraged to participate in
the permitting process and tools were developed to incorporate environmental justice
in the decision making process for issuing permits for the facilities. As a result, a
dirty facility might expect to face stricter permit requirements or even fail to obtain
permits in these communities and hence would be less likely to enter these counties.
Thus, this might explain the less disparate behavior with respect to entry decisions of
dirty facilities.
3.5 Robustness Checks
As noted earlier, studies examining environmental inequity have controlled for
a variety of factors to evaluate if there is a significant correlation between race/income
and environmental hazard (for example, location of hazardous waste facilities, of TRI
facilities, or toxic releases from facilities). Hence, I consider adding some of these
statistical controls to my main specification 3.4.1 to inspect if my results are robust
to these additions.38 Daniels and Friedman (1999) use among other controls, median
value of owner occupied housing and proportion urban. To account for these factors, I
add in median value of owner occupied housing units in a county and a dummy39 which
takes a value of 1 if the county is rural and 0 otherwise. Following Arora and Cason
(1999), I include total population and percentage of family households with a female
head as controls. In addition, Arora and Cason (1999) uses several variables to proxy
for the propensity of the community to engage in collective action.40 Thus, again, I
add the following factors as one variable, propensity to action: Percent of civilian
labor force commuting by car, truck, or van, Percent of civilian labor force commuting
by public transportation (excluding taxicab), Percent of renter occupied housing,
Percent of family households with own children under 18+, Percent of population 25
years and over with Bachelor’s degree, and Percent of civilian labor force employed in
manufacturing.
As can be seen from the reported results in Table 3.9, after controlling
for these additional variables, the percentage of nonwhite/Hispanic population and
median household income are still significant predictors of the facility’s environmental
38I also reran other specifications with additional controls and the results stay mostly unchanged.
39This rural/urban classification is obtained from https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/
geography/guidance/geo-areas/urban-rural.html.
40Hamilton (1995a) discusses and tests the theory of collective action (Olson, 2012) in relation to
environmental justice.
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activities as found in this study. Additionally, the difference between the estimates of
median household income in 2009 and 2016 is statistically significant (at least in the
case of facility’s share of emissions released) indicating a decrease in environmental
inequity in 2016 compared to 2009, similar to the results in section 3.4.1.1.
Since the dependent variables, a facility’s share of emissions released and
recycled, are bound between 0 and 1, it might seem appropriate to use fractional re-
sponse estimation.41 Thus, next I rerun the specification 3.4.1 using fractional response
estimation for which the results are presented in Table 3.10. These results again are
in favor of those in section 3.4.1.1. Specifically, the percentage of nonwhite/Hispanic
population and median household income remain significant determinants of facility’s
environmental activities. In addition, the signs of the coefficient estimates seem
consistent with our OLS estimates.42 Moreover, as can be seen, there seems to an
evidence of reduction in environmental inequity in 2016 compared to 2009 especially
with respect to median household income. Specifically, the statistically significant
difference43 between the coefficient estimates of median household income in 2009 and
2016, indicates that the effect of a one unit increase in county’s median household
income in 2016 was significantly lower than its effect in 2009.
41In addition, I reran the specifications with probit estimation when the dependent variable was a
binary variable, such as source reduction, exit, and entry dummy variables. I find that probit fails to
perform.
42This study uses OLS estimation since it is believed to handle the fixed effects better than
probit/logit.
43The difference between the coefficient estimates of median household income in 2009 and 2016,
from fractional response estimation, is statistically significant at least in terms of share of emissions
released.
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3.6 Conclusion
In the last few decades, substantial literature has flourished examining en-
vironmental inequity or environmental injustice. Although environmental justice
concerns were first seriously considered at the federal level during the Clinton ad-
ministration in the 1990s, little progress was made until the beginning of Obama
administration. This is the first empirical study that attempts to explore a possible
link between these EJ efforts during the Obama administration and the change in en-
vironmental inequity, as examined using change in facilities’ underlying environmental
behavior with respect to their share of emissions released/recycled, source reduction
activities, and exit/entry decisions, focusing on the period at the beginning of Obama
administration (2009) and towards the end of the administration (2016).
As the results from the cross sectional analysis for 2009 and 2016 show, there
is an evidence of presence of environmental inequity in both years, with a county’s
percentage of non-white population, Hispanic population, and median household
income being important determinants of a facility’s environmental activities, after
controlling for various chemical, state, and industry characteristics using fixed effects.
In addition, the findings suggest that a high-nonwhite, low-income county and a high-
Hispanic, low income county were more fairly treated by facilities in 2016 compared
to 2009. Specifically, the gap between facility’s treatment of these counties and
of a low-minority, high-income county reduced in 2016 when compared to 2009 in
terms of a facility’s share of emissions released, recycled and likelihood of conducting
source reduction activities. When examining the change in the state of environmental
inequity through facilities’ entry/exit decisions, I find a reduction in facilities’ disparate
behavior towards the end of the Obama administration. Specifically, I find that a
dirty facility was more likely to exit from a high-nonwhite, low-income county and a
high-Hispanic, low-income county during the period 2010 to 2016 than a clean facility.
Furthermore, a dirty facility was more likely to exit from a high-nonwhite, low-income
county than from a low-minority, high-income county.
Although no causality can be inferred from this study, given the time period
of this study, there is reason to suspect that EJ efforts in the Obama administration
might have been associated with this observed reduction in environmental inequity
during that period. Specifically, under Plan EJ 2014, there were efforts aimed at
ensuring compliance by the facilities and undertaking adequate enforcement activities
in overburdened communities. Such steps might have encouraged facilities to conduct
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more environmentally sustainable activities such as recycling and reducing their
chemical emissions at the source, and less dirty activities such as release or disposal of
chemical emissions. Moreover, these measures, particularly the tracking of facilities’
performance, might have encouraged dirty facilities to exit from high-minority, low-
income counties.
Many previous studies have found that dirty polluting facilities tend to
locate in high minority neighborhoods, an evidence of environmental inequity. On
the contrary, the this study finds that dirty facilities are less likely to enter44 a
high-nonwhite, low income county or a high-Hispanic, low income county than a
low-minority, high income county from 2010 to 2016. One of the EJ efforts under
Plan EJ 2014 that could possibly explain this less disparate behavior of a facility
with respect to its entry decisions is incorporating environmental justice concerns
into the process of issuing permits, especially in overburdened communities. These
efforts might have discouraged the dirty facilities to locate or pollute in high-minority,
low-income counties during the period 2010 to 2016 because they could anticipate
stringent requirements for permits.
Overall, this study suggests the dearth of data to examine the impacts of
policies or rulemakings that address environmental injustice and the need for further
research that could help establish a causal relation between EJ efforts by the Obama
administration and the reduction of environmental injustice.
44Note that the unit of observation for this analysis was facility-chemical-industry pair in a county.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
2009
Percent Released 68,440 0.50 0.46 0 1
Percent Recycled 68,440 0.23 0.39 0 1
SR activities (0/1) 81,239 0.07 0.25 0 1
Percent nonwhite 55,794 0.19 0.13 0.01 0.76
Percent hispanic 57,779 0.13 0.14 0.00 0.94
HH Median Income (in 10k $US) 57,779 5.10 1.16 2.48 11.42
2016
Percent Released 67,475 0.48 0.46 0 1
Percent Recycled 67,475 0.24 0.41 0 1
SR activities (0/1) 79,767 0.06 0.24 0 1
Percent nonwhite 54,712 0.19 0.13 0.01 0.80
Percent hispanic 56,172 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.95
Median HH Income (in 10k $US) 56,172 5.80 1.33 3.12 13.45
Note: SR (0/1) denotes a dummy which is 1 if a facility conducts source reduction
activity in a given year and 0 otherwise. S.D. stands for standard deviation. HH denotes
household.
Table 3.2: County Characteristics 2009
County Percent
Nonwhite
Percent
Hispanic
Median HH
Inc (in k$US)
Apache County, AZ 74 6 26.4
El Paso County, TX 5 82 36.1
Merrimack County, NH 2 1.5 63
A Median County 16 7 49
Note: HH and Inc denote household and Income respectively.
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Table 3.3: Cross section 2009 and 2016
Dependent Variable % Released % Recycled SR (0/1)
2009 2016 2009 2016 2009 2016
Percent Nonwhite -0.031* -0.025 -0.069*** -0.063*** -0.031*** -0.015
(0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
Percent Hispanic 0.070*** 0.134*** -0.037** -0.041** -0.032** 0.005
(0.024) (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
Median HH Income -0.019*** -0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002* 0.006*** 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.250 0.250 0.440 0.461 0.038 0.038
Observations 46862 46136 46862 46136 55707 54612
Predictive Margins
Apache County, AZ 0.496*** 0.437*** 0.195*** 0.226*** 0.043*** 0.056***
(high Nonwhite, low income) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
El Paso County, TX 0.552*** 0.552*** 0.221*** 0.289*** 0.047*** 0.071***
(high Hispanic, low income) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Merrimack county, NH 0.446*** 0.430*** 0.268*** 0.280*** 0.090*** 0.072***
(low minority, high income) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
A Median County 0.472*** 0.443*** 0.248*** 0.265*** 0.090*** 0.068***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
All regressions include two digit NAICS industry fixed effects, state fixed effects, and chemical fixed
effects. Med HH Inc denotes median household income. SR (0/1) denotes a dummy which is 1 if a
facility conducts source reduction activity in a given year and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.4: Change in Environmental Activity - 2009 to 2016
Dependent Variable % Released % Recycled SR (0/1)
2016-2009 2016-2009 2016-2009
Percent Nonwhite 0.035** -0.002 -0.011
(0.017) (0.013) (0.016)
Percent Hispanic -0.014 0.020 0.029
(0.023) (0.016) (0.021)
Median HH Income 0.009 -0.003 -0.051**
(in 100 k$US) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020)
R-squared 0.021 0.015 0.023
Observations 25642 25642 30926
Predictive Margins
Apache County, AZ 0.009 0.004 0.005
(high minority, low income) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009)
El Paso County, TX -0.025 0.020* 0.029**
(high Hispanic, low income) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014)
Merrimack county, NH -0.013*** 0.004 -0.008*
(low minority, high income) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
A Median County -0.010*** 0.005*** 0.000
(0.003) (0.007) (0.002)
All regressions include two digit NAICS industry fixed effects, state fixed effects,
and chemical fixed effects. Med HH Inc denotes median household income.
SR (0/1) denotes a dummy which is 1 if a facility conducts source reduction
activity in 2009 and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.5: Facility exit decisions
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Facility exit Facility exit Facility exit
dummy dummy dummy
% Release % Recycled SR (0/1)
Y2009 0.093*** -0.005 -0.038
(0.026) (0.029) (0.038)
Percent nonwhite 0.028 0.036 0.044**
(0.029) (0.023) (0.020)
Percent Hispanic -0.030 -0.078*** -0.041
(0.033) (0.030) (0.026)
Med HH Inc 0.012*** 0.006** 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Pct nonwhite x Y2009 0.049 0.083* -0.009
(0.039) (0.047) (0.066)
Pct Hispanic x Y2009 -0.054 0.095** 0.055
(0.035) (0.042) (0.058)
Med HH Inc x Y2009 -0.012*** -0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Emissions2009 0.400 -0.008 -0.291
(0.718) (0.774) (0.796)
R-squared 0.053 0.053 0.050
Observations 46862 46862 55707
All regressions include two digit NAICS industry fixed effects, state fixed
effects, and chemical fixed effects. Med HH Inc denotes median household
income. SR (0/1) denotes a dummy which is 1 if a facility conducts source
reduction activity in 2009 and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.6: Facility exit behavior - Predictive Margins
High Nonwhite, High Hispanic, Low Minority, Median
Low Income, Low Income, High Income, County
Apache County El Paso county Merrimack County
Dirty Facility 0.501*** 0.385*** 0.450*** 0.456***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.008) (0.005)
Clean Facility 0.406*** 0.375*** 0.429*** 0.415***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.007) (0.004)
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Table 3.7: Facility entry decisions
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Facility entry Facility entry Facility entry
dummy dummy dummy
% Release % Recycled SR (0/1)
Y2016 0.047* 0.024 -0.030
(0.025) (0.028) (0.040)
Percent nonwhite -0.015 -0.048** -0.096***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.019)
Percent Hispanic -0.136*** -0.046 -0.020
(0.032) (0.028) (0.025)
Med HH Inc 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Pct nonwhite x Y2016 -0.083** -0.041 0.112*
(0.037) (0.044) (0.065)
Pct Hispanic x Y2016 0.158*** -0.008 -0.049
(0.033) (0.040) (0.052)
Med HH Inc x Y2016 -0.001 -0.005 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Emissions2016 -0.127*** -0.136*** -0.156***
(0.039) (0.035) (0.037)
R-squared 0.078 0.076 0.071
Observations 46136 46136 54612
All regressions include two digit NAICS industry fixed effects, state fixed effects,
and chemical fixed effects. Med HH Inc denotes median household income. SR
(0/1) denotes a dummy which is 1 if a facility conducts source reduction activity in
2016 and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.8: Facility Entry Behavior - Predictive Margins
High Nonwhite, High Hispanic, Low Minority, Median
Low Income, Low Income, High Income, County
Apache County El Paso county Merrimack County
Dirty Facility 0.364*** 0.452*** 0.455*** 0.434***
(0.016) (0.022) (0.008) (0.004)
Clean Facility 0.373*** 0.285*** 0.415*** 0.393***
(0.016) (0.022) (0.007) (0.004)
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Table 3.9: Robustness Checks Cross section: Additional Control Variables
Dependent Variable % Released % Recycled Source Reduction (0/1)
2009 2016 2009 2016 2009 2016
Percent Nonwhite 0.041 -0.050 -0.115*** -0.151*** 0.003 -0.087***
(0.042) (0.037) (0.033) (0.028) (0.027) (0.024)
Percent Hispanic 0.093*** 0.138*** -0.042 -0.080*** 0.015 -0.042**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.027) (0.027) (0.019) (0.021)
Median HH Income -0.019*** -0.001 0.006** 0.005** 0.004 0.003**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total population 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Rural dummy 0.018 0.001 0.011 0.010 -0.054*** -0.008
(0.028) (0.016) (0.022) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009)
Pct fam HH Femhead 0.045 0.529*** -0.006 0.195 -0.325*** 0.233**
(0.170) (0.170) (0.134) (0.131) (0.109) (0.105)
Value Occ Hunits -0.008* -0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.016*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Prop to action -0.056* -0.045 0.036 0.121*** 0.014 0.057***
(0.033) (0.028) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018)
R-squared 0.244 0.248 0.434 0.453 0.042 0.040
Observations 38912 38594 38912 38594 46302 45663
All regressions include two digit NAICS industry fixed effects, state fixed effects, and chemical fixed
effects. Med HH Inc denotes median household income. SR (0/1) denotes a dummy which is 1 if a
facility conducts source reduction activity in a given year and 0 otherwise. Pct fam HH Femhead
denotes percentage of family households with a female head. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Value Occ Hunits denotes Median value of owner occupied housing units and Prop to action denotes
Propensity to action. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.10: Cross sectional Regressions: Fractional Response
Dependent Variable % Released % Recycled
2009 2016 2009 2016
Percent Nonwhite -0.097* -0.074 -0.358*** -0.314***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.066) (0.065)
Percent Hispanic 0.213*** 0.406*** -0.181** -0.205**
(0.071) (0.069) (0.091) (0.090)
Median HH Income -0.056*** -0.018*** 0.023*** 0.012*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
R-squared 0.169 0.169 0.359 0.379
Observations 46957 46235 46957 46235
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Chapter 4 Ambulance Service Ownership and Management: How It
Affects Quality of Service Delivery1
This study investigates how ownership and/or management affects ambulance
services across the United States. We investigate whether ambulance quality, measured
by patient transportation time, varies by organization type. We estimate the effect of
ownership structure on response time variables using data from the National EMS
Information System (NEMSIS) for the years 2010-2015, the most comprehensive data
set on emergency medical services. Focusing on ground transportation (as opposed
to air and water transportation) we find that, on average, ambulance services owned
by fire departments respond faster than those managed by other types of ownership.
Specifically, fire-department-owned medical emergency services located in urban areas
are approximately 17 percent or six minutes faster than those owned by community
nonprofit organizations, and are around four minutes faster than those owned by
government agencies. Using some admittedly crude measures of costs, we find no
evidence of significant cost differences by ownership structure. Based on evidence from
other sources, we find some weak evidence that private-sector ambulances are better
than other types of ambulances at collecting payment from patients, private-sector
insurance companies, Medicare, and Medicaid. In the end, the strongest conclusion
is that few reliable data are available to guide local governments that are trying to
decide how to structure emergency services in their region.
1This chapter is a joint work with SuZanne Troske, Kenneth Troske, and Alison Davis.
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4.1 Introduction
The US emergency departments (ED) have seen rapid growth in patients
visits in the past two decades. From 1997 to 2007, the ED visits increased by 23%
(Tang et al., 2010). Similarly the number went up by 18.4% from 2006 to 2014 with
the visits having gone up from 89 million to 106 million (Lin et al., 2018). Emergency
Medical Services or ambulances serve as major conduits for transporting the patients
from their residence or other locations to the ED.
While the first ambulance service in the United States was initiated in 1865,
the federal government got involved in emergency medical services (EMS) only in
the 1970s. According to a comprehensive report on EMS (Institute of Medicine
et al., 2006), since the early 1980s, federal support of EMS agencies has declined
rapidly. Today, the report claims, local governments are primarily responsible for
managing and financing EMS systems. The local and regional EMS systems are
overseen by the state EMS agencies. However, the report suggests that the lack of
federal structure and the presence of this local control has led to fragmentation and
large variability in the level of EMS service offered across regions in the United States.
In the postwar era, municipal hospitals, fire departments, and funeral homes were
primarily responsible for transporting patients EMS (Institute of Medicine et al., 2006).
Today, numerous entities provide ambulance services across the United States. Such
entities include community nonprofit organizations, fire departments, government
(excludes fire departments), hospitals, and private nonhospital organizations. Yet,
little is known about potential differences in the performance of EMS by organizational
structure.
However, knowledge of the most efficient way to organize an ambulance service
is important for local governments, because as support from the federal government
declines, ambulance services risk being scaled back or completely dissolved. For
instance, Letcher County, Kentucky, reduced funding to its ambulance service because
of the loss of revenue from the coal severance tax (Estep, 2017a). One way communities
can conserve resources is by directing them to the most efficient ambulance service
and continuing to ensure that their residents have access to ambulance services. Our
study is an early attempt to address this lack of knowledge by examining how the
ownership structure of an ambulance service affects the quality of emergency service
delivery to the community. We believe that the results from this paper could better
inform communities on how to choose the most efficient way to provide ambulance
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services.
To examine the performance of ambulances, we use response times as a proxy
for quality. Broadly, we want to answer the question of how prehospital emergency care
affects patients health outcomes. Several studies have found a significant relationship
between response times and patient outcomes (Pons et al., 2005; Wilde, 2013). In
addition, emergency service providers use response times to track and assess their
performance and to vie for contracts (McCallion, 2012).
Our study utilizes a unique, restricted access data set containing information
on emergency ambulance calls at the national level. This database is maintained by
the National Emergency Medical Services Information System (NEMSIS), a national
registry of emergency ambulance 911 calls. NEMSIS integrates and standardizes the
data collected by EMS across the United States (NEMSIS, 2016). Until NEMSIS
came into existence in 2001, there were no data available on ambulance calls at the
national level.
In this study, we find that ambulance services operated and owned by fire
departments are the fastest in responding to an emergency ambulance call when
compared to all other ownership types. In urban areas, the fire department EMS
response times average four to six minutes faster (12 percent). We also find that all
types of ambulance services tend to use similar vehicles and staff ambulances with
personnel with similar training, which provides some crude evidence that they have
similar costs. We also draw on several different articles to provide weak evidence
that for-profit ambulance services are better at being reimbursed by patients, private
insurance companies, or federal programs such as Medicaid or Medicare, meaning
local taxpayers may face less of a burden in financing these types of ambulances.
Our main conclusion is that, given the amount of money being spent on ambulance
services in the United States, it is surprising that data on the performance and costs
of ambulances are almost nonexistent. Local governments have little evidence to
use when deciding how to organize their local ambulance services. While our results
provide some evidence on one measure of quality, it would be useful to have other
measures of quality as well as costs, so it seems worth investing additional resources
to collect this additional information.
The following Section 4.2 provides an overview of the related literature.
Section 4.3 describes the data and descriptive statistics for the variables used in our
analysis. The methodology is discussed in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the results
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and robustness checks. Section 4.6 discusses other topics to consider for our analysis.
Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Previous Literature
Scant literature exists on the effect of ownership type on ambulance services.
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2012) uses the results from a
national survey of ground ambulance providers to examine the impact of ambulance
provider ownership and other ambulance provider characteristics on total cost per
transport among providers. It finds that ownership had no significant effect on
differences in cost per transport.
Costs, however, determine quality of ambulance service. (GAO, 2003) de-
composes the total costs of an ambulance provider. The main components that make
up the costs are labor costs, administrative costs, vehicle and equipment costs, and
building costs. The labor costs would, for example, include the salaries and wages of
EMTs and paramedics. National estimates suggest the mean annual wages for these
workers in 2016 and 2018 were $36,110 and $37,760 respectively.2 For ambulance
services run by fire departments, the labor costs would also include the salaries of
fire fighters who respond to medical emergency calls. The mean annual wage for a
firefighter in 2016 and 2018 were $50,520 and $53,240 respectively.3 These above
mentioned fixed costs do not change with the number of transports made whereas
variable costs, such as fuel and supply costs, which account for a very small percentage
of costs, vary with the number of trips (GAO, 2003).
Further, GAO (2007) conducted a study that included 215 ambulance
providers without shared costs4 to evaluate the impact of various provider char-
acteristics on costs per transport. The factors that affected the estimated average cost
the most were volume of transports, type of vehicle (ALS or BLS), area served by the
provider, amount of local tax support, and productivity. The estimated average cost
per transport reduced by around 30% for the providers with high volume of transports
when compared to ones with low volume of trips.5 For the providers that served
2This information was obtained from https://www.bls.gov/.
3This information was obtained from https://www.bls.gov/.
4According to the GAO (2007) report, providers without shared costs are providers that (1) did
not share costs with other institutions or services or (2) shared costs but reported costs of ambulance
services separately from the costs of their other services.
5Low volume of trips include 2000 or fewer transports per year whereas high volume of trips
include providers with more than 3000 transports (GAO, 2007)
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super-rural areas,6 the average cost per trip went up from around $360 to $545 when
compared to those serving urban areas. Providers specializing in ALS had 30% more
costs per transport than those specializing in BLS. Furthermore, the providers who
received a large percentage of their financial support from local taxes had 61% more
costs per transport than the providers who received no local tax support. However,
other characteristics that did not significantly affect the costs per transport were the
type of provider, building rent, and price of fuel.
The decision for a community to utilize either a private or public entity for
ambulance service might depend on several factors. Chiang et al. (2006) analyze
theoretically and empirically how some city-level factors such as population, population
age, urban density, health status, and crime levels affect the decision of using either
a public or private provider in urban areas. Holian (2009) develops a public choice
model to identify variables that determine whether a city outsources its ambulance
service. He finds that cities with mayors as opposed to city managers were more
responsive to elderly voters when it came to ambulance outsourcing.
Perhaps the closest study to ours is Déziel (2017), which investigates the
relationship between the ownership of the organization that provided the ambulance
service and the likelihood of their engaging in patient transport. Taking into account
4.6 million 911 ambulance requests from 2009 to 2013 in Virginia, the study finds that
private for-profit ambulance services were 4.5 times more likely to transport a patient
than publicly owned ambulance services. Additionally, private nonprofit organizations
were two times more likely than private for-profit organizations to transport the
patient.
Our study differs from Déziel (2017) by using data from a national database
of EMS activities, which includes information provided by all but four states. We
examine the relationship between ownership of the ambulance service provider and
quality of the services provided, measured by response times. To our knowledge, no
study to date investigates this relationship.
Since studies on ownership of ambulance services are rare, we also examined
studies of hospital ownership and its effect on quality of care. For instance, Duggan
(2000) studies the effect of ownership of hospitals on organizational behavior and quality
of medical care. This study, by exploiting an exogenous change in a government policy
called the Disproportionate Share Program (DSH), implemented in 1990, examines
6According to GAO (2007), CMS defines super-rural transports as those that originate in the
bottom 25 percent of rural areas as defined by population density.
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how private for-profit, private not-for-profit, and public hospitals used the financial
incentives provided by this program to improve the quality of medical care. It finds
that private not-for-profit hospitals were no more likely than for-profit hospitals to
use the funds to enhance the quality of medical care for poor patients.
Ultimately, the question is how the ownership type of the ambulance service
is related to patient health outcomes. While we cannot directly try to answer this
question here, we can examine ambulance response time, which recent work suggests
is a good proxy for patient outcomes (Wilde, 2013; Jena et al., 2017).
Various studies have examined other factors that might affect the response
times of ambulances. For 127 large US cities, Lambert, Min, and Srinivasan (2009) use
a Tobit model to identify factors that can influence EMS average response times and
find that cities that are more densely populated, geographically dispersed, and have
higher income levels have higher quality EMS than other cities. Courtemanche et al.
(2019) exploit the variation in uninsured rates at the county level for the pre-Affordable
Care Act (ACA) period to explore the association between implementation of the
ACA and response times for motor vehicle crashes. Their study finds that after the
ACA was implemented, a 1 percent increase in insurance enrollment was followed by
an increase of 22.8 percent in response times.
To date, no study systematically examines the differential effects of provider
ownership in rural versus urban areas. Rural EMS agencies have their own set of
challenges that can negatively affect the quality of EMS (Lambert et al., 2009). The
characteristics of providers serving rural areas are shaped by the challenges posed by
these areas. The volume of trips tends to be much lower in rural counties compared
to their urban counterparts and results in higher costs per trip due to the fixed costs
of operating an ambulance service (GAO, 2003).7 Rural ambulance services are also
characterized by longer travel distances, heavy reliance on Medicare payments, and
shortages of volunteer staff, all of which can lead to longer response times (GAO,
2000).8
Traditionally, rural ambulance providers have been more heavily dependent
on volunteers than urban providers have (Institute of Medicine et al., 2006). Ott and
Hasanen (1995) analyze findings from a study conducted by the Wyoming Department
7On average, in 2001, the volume of trips in urban counties was around eight times that in rural
counties (GAO, 2003).
8On average, in 1998, 44 percent of the annual revenue for rural providers came from Medicare;
the figure was 15 percent in 1989. Also, around 50 percent of rural providers depend on volunteers,
whereas 24 percent of urban providers rely on volunteers (GAO, 2000).
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of Health for 19821992 and conclude that volunteer recruitment and retention is one
of the biggest challenges facing rural EMS agencies. Freeman et al. (2008) find that
as the level of rurality went up, the percentage of respondents reporting difficulty
in retaining staff increased, too. In our study, we also analyze how the quality of
ambulance service is affected by the staffing of the ambulance provider.
4.3 Data
This study uses data from NEMSIS, a national repository of EMS data. The
data are de-identified individual patient and ambulance service data on a single EMS
use from 2010 through 2015. The reportable geographic information is limited to the
nine Census divisions and the urban/rural location of an ambulance service. The
NEMSIS data are a convenience sample, meaning the data are voluntarily collected
from each jurisdiction in a state. In 2015, EMS in 47 states and Washington, DC,
reported data to NEMSIS. Four statesDelaware, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texashave
never reported data to NEMSIS. Figure 4.1 shows the year each state started reporting
some data to NEMSIS. Some states report data on the majority of calls and others
report only a portion of calls. NEMSIS (2016) indicates that data probably contain
a disproportionate number of agencies with greater resources and more informed
leadership with the ability to adopt reporting standards. They also believe that
reporting agencies and states have demonstrated a commitment to monitoring and
improving care of patients treated and transported by EMS (NEMSIS, 2016). NEMSIS
does not examine whether there are differences in reporting by ownership type.
For each ambulance call, NEMSIS data include information on the character-
istics of patients and the ambulance service, such as the patients age, gender, whether
it was a 911 call, and whether there was transport to a hospital. The data also include
the highest level of ambulance staff that could respond to an incident, as well as the
duration of different portions of the call: time to incident scene, time at incident scene,
and time to emergency department.
There were approximately 56 million observations containing data on the
following variables: ambulance response times for 911 calls; ownership type of the
ambulance service; patients gender, race, ethnicity, and age and other ambulance
agency-related variables such as staff medical status, staff composition, service level
as defined by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS); and ambulance
agency locations such as Census division, Census region, and urban/rural area. We
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dropped race and ethnicity because they contain many missing values. Moreover,
the data on race are believed to be unreliable in emergency situations (Hsia et al.,
2017). For location, we included Census division and whether the ambulance service
is located in an urban or rural area. Below, we explain the variables in more detail.
The ownership types for ambulance services are distinguished by the primary
funding source and management. Ambulance services are categorized into five types:
fire department, government, community nonprofit, hospital-based, and private non-
hospital. Fire-department-based ambulance services are a unit of the government and
are managed under the fire department and possibly other emergency units. EMS
employees are often trained for both working on an ambulance and other emergency
duties. Government agencies are part of the local government, but are organized as
separate, free-standing departments unconnected to a fire department or as a subunit
of another department such as the public health or police departments. Community
nonprofit agencies are not a part of the local government; they are managed by a
separate community organization. The government contracts with these agencies to
provide ambulance service, and these agencies are usually monitored by a medical
director from the government. They are often recognized as nonprofit organizations
by the Internal Revenue Service.
Hospital-based ambulance services are managed by hospitals and may be
for-profit or nonprofit, depending on the management of the hospital. EMS personnel
are hospital employees. Private, nonhospital agencies are for-profit companies not
affiliated with a hospital and assume complete control of delivering ambulance services
to a community. A government may choose to contract with a for-profit company
when the government does not want to assume the financial burden of maintaining an
ambulance service. Private companies include American Medical Response (AMR),
the largest for-profit ambulance service in the United States. Cone et al. (2014)
provides a good discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each organization
type.
The funding of these ambulance organization types varies. Patients generally
do not directly pay for fire department and government ambulance services, but they
do pay for access through taxes. Community and hospital-based services also rely
on taxes, but additionally rely on other sources, such as insurance reimbursements,
payments from Medicaid and Medicare, donations, and grants. These agencies are
expected to be more financially self-sustaining. The private service is a fee-for-service
82
model reliant on medical insurance reimbursements, payments from Medicaid and
Medicare, and the collection of fees from patients, including insurance copays and
self-payments (Kahn, 2012). All funding models struggle to cover the cost of providing
ambulance service, and some have found creative ways to fund their operations, such
as crowdfunding and membership programs (Avsec, 2016).
Table 4.1 describes the distribution by organization types of all ambulance
trips reported to NEMSIS in 20102015, with transport to a hospital for all age groups
(0-17, 18-64, and 65 and over). The largest category of trips is by ambulances operated
by fire departments, with private nonhospital companies and government as the next
two most frequent servicers.
The NEMSIS data summarized in table 4.1 reflect the number of ambulance
calls, but not the number of ambulance service companies or organizations. Table 4.2
shows the percentage of companies by organizational type based on a 2011 national
survey of ambulance organizations conducted by the National Association of State
EMS Officials (NASEMSO) (Federal Interagency Committee on Emergency Medical
Services, 2012). The greatest number of ambulance companies are fire-department-
based services with government and private services being the next most popular
organization types. All states responding to the NASEMSO survey had fire department-
based services somewhere in their state. The other common types are government
and private nonhospital. While most states have some hospital-based services, they
are a small percentage of the total.
We are interested in four ambulance response times that are included in the
NEMSIS data. Our primary response time is Total Response Time, defined as the
time from when the unit is notified by the 911 dispatch to when the patient arrives at
the hospital. This time is the sum of Time to Scene, Scene Time, and Transport Time.
Time to Scene is the time from when the EMS unit is notified by the 911 dispatch and
the unit arrives at the scene. Scene Time is the time from when the EMS unit arrives
at the scene to when it leaves the scene. Transport Time is the time between when
the EMS unit leaves the scene of the incident and the patient arrives at a hospital.
For all the call times considered in our analysis, NEMSIS recorded some
zero, negative, and very large positive values. According to NEMSIS, one of the main
reasons for these errors is keying in the wrong date and/or time. NEMSIS also reports
that when the agency does not report a time, the system automatically gives it a
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default value, which can result in large negative and positive values.9 For some calls,
the agencies report the same time for different call time variables, which results in a
response time of zero. These errors can sometimes also occur due to cancelled calls. To
avoid measurement error due to these errors, we drop observations with total response
times of less than 10 minutes and greater than 120 minutes. Since Total Response
Time is the sum of Time to Scene, Scene Time, and Transport Time, each of these
times also has to be less than 120 minutes. Limiting the sample this way results in
dropping 1,190,901 observations.
The staff composition variable contains the data on the composition of staff
employed by the ambulance agency. Some agencies are staffed by volunteers (unpaid
staff), some by nonvolunteers (paid staff), and some by a mix of nonvolunteers and
volunteers. Volunteer workers usually have similar training as paid workers, but in
general do not sleep at the agency facility and work fewer hours than paid workers.
Also, their training is often paid for by the agency. The definitions of volunteer and
nonvolunteer are based on state and local definitions (CMS, 2018). In 2015, about 78
percent of all trips were staffed by nonvolunteers, a few trips were all volunteers, and
about 19 percent were a mix of volunteers and paid staff.
The agencies also report to NEMSIS the highest level of credentials of
medical responders available to send on each call. These medical responders can
be a first responder, nurse, physician, emergency medical technician (EMT)-Basic,
EMT-Intermediate, or EMT-Paramedic. Figure 4.2 provides definitions for first
responders and the various types of EMTs. In 2015, for over 90 percent of the trips,
an EMT-Paramedic was the highest level available across all EMTs.
NEMSIS provides data on the CMS-defined level of service provided for each
call. The levels of ambulance service are: Basic Life Support (BLS); BLS Emergency;
Advanced Life Support (ALS); ALS Level 1 Emergency; ALS Level 2 Emergency;
Paramedic Intercept (PI); Specialty Care Transport (SCT); and air ambulance ser-
vicesfixed wing and rotary wing. Our study focuses on ground transportation; hence,
we exclude observations for air ambulance services. The categories PI and SCT, along
with air ambulance services, account for few observations (243,228 of approximately
56 million), so we drop them from our analysis as well. CMS-defined service levels
provided by ambulance agencies are described in Figure 4.3.
NEMSIS data also indicate whether an ambulance service is located in an
9This information came from email correspondence with the NEMSIS staff in August 2018.
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urban, suburban, rural, or wilderness area based on the zip code of the ambulance
service. These designations are based on the 2003 US Department of Agriculture
(USDA) Urban Influence Codes (UIC) (USDA, 2013). In our analysis, we combine
the urban and suburban locations into a single location designated as urban, and we
combine the rural and wilderness designations into a single location designated as
rural.
4.4 Methodology
Our main estimation model specification is as follows:
lnYijkt = α + Aijktβ +Xijktδ + γk + τt + εijkt (4.4.1)
where lnYijkt is the natural log of Total Response Time, Scene Time, Time to Scene,
or Transport Time for the ambulance call i, with ownership structure j, located in
Census division k, in year t. We measure response times in logs because it provides a
better fit with the data and allows us to interpret the coefficients as percent change.
We estimate separate regressions for each response time so we can see where possible
differences in the response times occur. These call times are proxies for quality of the
ambulance service.
Aijkt is a matrix of
• variables related to the type of ambulance responding to the call, including
dummy variables for the categories of ownership of the ambulance service
provider: community nonprofit, fire department, government, hospital, and
private nonhospital;
• an interaction between a variable indicating if the ambulance service is located
in an urban area and the ownership type dummy variables;
• dummy variables indicating staff medical level: EMT-Basic, EMT-Intermediate,
EMT-Paramedic, nurse, physician, and first responder;
• dummy variables indicating the staff compositionall volunteer, all paid staff, and
a mixture of both volunteer and paid staff; and
• the CMS service level of the ambulance: BLS, BLS Emergency, ALS Level 1,
ALS Level 1 Emergency, and ALS Level 2.
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Xijkt is a matrix containing variables on patient characteristics, including
a dummy variable indicating if the patient is female and the patients age. γk is a
set of dummy variables for different Census divisions, τt are year dummies, and εijkt
is the error term. We include dummies for Census divisions to account for different
conditions in the regions. We include year dummies to account for national time
trends such as business cycles that are common to the Census divisions, but vary over
time. The coefficients on the ownership variables, as well as the coefficients on our
interactions between ownership structure and the urban dummy, are the parameters
of interest. They denote the average impact of ambulance provider ownership on the
quality of ambulance services, while controlling for other variables.
To account for the within-Census-division correlation on the response time
variable, using equation 4.4.1, we cluster the standard errors by Census division. This
approach relaxes the assumption of independence of observations, although it requires
the observations to be independent across the clusters. The reason for clustering here
is that we believe both the regressors and the errors might be correlated within a
Census division.
Our final sample used in the regression analysis is a reduced version of the
original NEMSIS dataset. The original dataset contained 56,057,075 observations. As
mentioned above, we focus exclusively on ground transport and exclude the PI and
SCT and air transports, which results in dropping 61,315 observations. We also drop
an additional 1,190,901 observations by limiting the total response time to a range
from 10 to 120 minutes.
We additionally drop 21,827,430 observations with missing CMS service level,
1,548,433 observations where staff medical status was missing, 152,588 observations
where gender was missing, and 454,700 observations where the urban/rural variable
was missing. Additionally, we drop 77,672 observations where age is missing. The
final sample we use in our analysis contains 29,932,888 observations. Table 4.3, table
4.4, and table 4.5 present summary statistics based on our final sample used in our
analysis for all of the variables.
4.5 Main Results
The main results from our regressions of ambulance response time on owner-
ship structure are found in table 4.6 and 4.7. In column (1), we present the results
when the natural log of Total Response Time is the dependent variable; column (2)
86
shows the results when the natural log of Time to Scene is the dependent variable;
the results when the natural log of Scene Time is the dependent variable are found in
column (3); and the results when the natural log of Transport Time is the dependent
variable are in column (4).
Starting with the results in column (1), based on the value of the intercept,
we see that among community nonprofit ambulance services located in urban areas
(and controlling for the other variables), the average natural log of Total Response
Time is 3.50, which translates to an average total response time of approximately 39
minutes (this is calculated as e raised to the power 3.50). Looking at the coefficients
on the other ownership structure variables, we see that ambulances that are part of fire
departments operating in urban areas have the fastest response time, approximately
17 percent or around six minutes faster than community nonprofit ambulances, and
this difference is statistically significant. Ambulances run by local governments that
are not part of fire departments are approximately 5 percent, or approximately two
minutes, faster than community nonprofit ambulances. Finally, the coefficients show
that ambulances run by hospitals and operated by private companies are both faster
than community nonprofit ambulances, but the differences are small and not strongly
significant.10
Examining the results for ownership type interacted with the urban variable
(1 if rural or wilderness and 0 if urban or suburban) shows that ambulances that are
part of fire departments remain the fastest, arriving at a hospital on average four to
eight minutes faster than any other ambulance service. Among the other types of
ambulances, there is little difference in total response time for ambulances located in
rural areas; all take on average 32 to 36 minutes to get to the hospital after initially
receiving the 911 call. Unlike in urban areas, government run ambulances that are not
part of fire departments are around 2 minutes slower than the ones run by community
nonprofit organizations.
Looking at the coefficients on the other variables in the regression, we see
that ALS ambulances, especially Level 1 Emergency and Level 2 average less total
time per run. Looking at the staff medical status variables, it appears that ambulances
where a first responder is the highest level of staff that can be on the ambulance are
faster than the other categories. Most of the other categories are not faster than
ambulances with EMT-Basic staff. Ambulances staffed entirely with volunteers tend
10With around 30 million observations, we primarily focus on meaningful differences and not
results that are, at best, marginally significant.
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to be the slowest ambulances at all portions of the calls.
The results in columns (2) through (4) show that the primary reason that
ambulances that are part of fire departments are faster than the other types is that
they are significantly faster to the scene once they receive a 911 call, and they are
somewhat faster from the scene to the hospitalalthough in urban areas the difference in
the time from the scene to the hospital is much smaller. The actual time on the scene
is similar for ambulances regardless of ownership structure. One possible explanation
for why ambulances that are part of fire departments tend to be faster to the scene is
that municipalities tend to locate fire departments close to where people live to reduce
the time it takes to respond to a fire (Institute of Medicine et al., 2006), which in turn
could reduce the distance between the ambulance and the scene of a typical call.11
We estimate several additional regressions as a robustness check on our main
results. First, we estimate our regressions separately by year to see whether changes in
which states report data to NEMSIS affect our results. Overall, we find results similar
to those reported in table 4.6 and 4.7. We also estimate regressions where we drop
the CMS service level variables from our analysis, since these are the variables most
likely to have missing values. Doing so allows us to increase our sample size. Again,
this does not change our basic results. In addition, we estimate models using the
Total Response Time variable as constructed by NEMSIS, without dropping values
that are less than 10 minutes or greater than 120 minutes.12 While this changes the
significance of more of the coefficients, it does not change the basic patterns we see.
All of these results are available from the authors upon request.
Using Total Response Time as our measure of quality, and with the exception
of ambulances that are part of fire departments, our primary conclusion from these
regressions is that there does not appear to be much variation in the quality of service
provided by ambulances with differing ownership structures. This being the case, it
would appear that differences in costs would be a primary factor in determining which
ownership structure would be the most efficient for an area.
When thinking about the costs of operating an ambulance service, it is
important to recognize that many of the costs are essentially fixed. Ambulance
services are required to have equipment and staff available to answer 911 calls 24
11This would not account for why ambulances that are part of fire departments are faster from
the scene to the hospital, but as noted, this difference is much smaller for ambulances located in
urban areas.
12Since we take the natural log of the Total Response Time, values of zero are dropped.
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hours a day, 7 days a week. So increasing the number of runs an ambulance goes on
leads to a decline in the average cost per run, at least initially.13
One issue with trying to compare the costs of different types of ambulance
services is that few cost data are available for providers in this industry.14 However, a
recent GAO report (2012) estimates that over 60 percent of ambulance providers total
costs are for personnel, while another 14 percent are for vehicles (excluding fuel) and
for supplies and equipment.15 So one way to compare the costs of different types of
ambulance services is to compare the types of personnel used to staff the ambulances as
well as the types of vehicles and equipment they use. Table 4.8 does this by presenting
the percent of ambulance runs by staff medical status, staff composition, and CMS
service level by ownership structure. On ambulances operated by community nonprofit
organizations, a larger percentage of ambulance calls are staffed with EMT-Basic,
EMT-Intermediate, and first responders, and ambulances operated by hospitals have a
slightly larger percentage of nurses. However, other than these differences, ambulances
appear to carry similar medical staff regardless of ownership structure. We can also
see that ambulances run by community nonprofit organizations and fire departments
are more likely to use volunteers, which suggests that these ambulances may have
lower costs.
In the final section of table 4.8, we present the percent of runs by type of
ambulance and ownership structure. The GAO (2007) presents data showing that
ALS ambulances are more expensive to operate than BLS ambulances because of
the formers more sophisticated life-saving equipment and their staffing with more
highly trained workers. Table 4.8 shows that there is little difference in the types of
ambulances used by different ownership types of ambulance services. In addition, all
ownership structures are more likely to use BLS than ALS ambulances.
Hence it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions about the efficiency of
different forms of ambulance services based on the very crude cost measures available
in our data.16 Unfortunately, as noted above, there do not appear to be good data
13See GAO (2012) for an estimate of the average total cost curve for ambulances services. This
figure indicates that average total costs fall quite quickly initially, but also shows very little change
after relatively few runs in a year.
14A recent report to Congress by the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
concludes that, due to lack of data on ambulance costs, they are unable to provide Congress with
any recommended legislation for reimbursement policies for ambulances (HHS, 2015)
15One limitation of this study is that it does not have costs for ambulances that are part of
fire departments or hospitals because these agencies claim that they cannot separate the costs of
ambulance services from the costs of providing other services.
16GAO (2012) does find that taxpayer subsidies are associated with higher costs of operating
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easily available on the cost of running an ambulance service. In the absence of any
cost information and given our measure of quality, there do not appear to be large
differences in quality across organization types. Local governments will have to rely
on other factors when trying to select the most efficient form of EMS. In the next
section, we discuss other factors to consider.
4.6 Further Factors Affecting Ambulance Efficiency
Presumably, one of the main benefits of a private-sector ambulance service is
that it is more likely to bill the individuals who are consuming the services and less
likely to rely on taxpayer subsidies, which reduces the expense to local governments.
Some evidence supports the hypothesis that government-sponsored ambulance services
are less likely to file claims for reimbursement with Medicare, Medicaid, and private
insurance companies even when they are eligible to do so (Avsec, 2016). Further, the
GAO (2012) attributes much of the rise in measured ambulance transports from 2004
to 2010 to an increase in billing for Medicare services by local governments. Part
of the difficulty with filing for reimbursements is that fire departments and other
government ambulance services are not used to filing claims for services, so they do
not have staff who are trained to file claims, resulting in a larger number of claims
being rejected or not filed at all (Avsec, 2016).
Another issue that affects the efficiency of ambulance services is the incom-
plete reimbursement of costs by some insurers. The GAO (2007) estimates that, on
average, Medicare reimbursements only covered 94 percent of the costs of transporting
patients, meaning that EMS must cover the rest of the costs through a cross-subsidy
from other payers, primarily private-sector insurance companies or self-pay patients.
A related issue is nonpayment for services. The GAO (2012) reports that
ambulance services fail to collect on 26 percent of runs. There are several reasons
why companies cannot collect. First, it is often difficult for ambulance staff to collect
from patients the information needed to file a claim because, for many patients, their
condition does not allow them to communicate with the staff. Second, ambulances get
reimbursed from Medicaid, Medicare, and most private insurers only if they actually
transport a patient to the hospital.17 Not transporting patients to the hospital can
ambulances, which would seem to suggest that private sector ambulances would be more efficient,
but the GAO is careful not to draw any causal interpretations based on this finding.
17This rule might lead to some perverse incentives such as ambulance staff providing too much
medical care to keep the patient alive until they reach the hospital or the staff not providing ample
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occur for a number of reasons: the patient may die before the ambulance arrives on the
scene, or the patient may refuse to be transported. Finally, some patients do not have
insurance and simply refuse to pay for the services provided. There is some evidence
that EMS run by private companies are more willing to cross-subsidize Medicare and
Medicaid recipients by charging higher fees to patients with private insurance or no
insurance, are more aggressive in trying to obtain the information necessary to file a
reimbursement claim, and are much more aggressive in pursuing claims against people
unwilling to pay, although recent articles in the New York Times and the Washington
Post suggest that there may be some political costs from this more aggressive behavior
(Bailey, 2017; Ivory et al., 2016).18
Based on this previous work, there seems to be some weak evidence to suggest
that private-sector ambulances might be better at obtaining payments for services
from the people that actually use the services (or at least from the groups that insure
them) and less likely to require payments from local taxpayers, which would suggest an
increase in social welfare. Of course, this statement comes with a number of significant
caveats, and one needs to recognize that the more aggressive behavior by for-profit
ambulance companies may involve an increase in political costs.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper represents an early effort at trying to provide information for
local governments that are trying to decide on the best way to structure EMS in
their area. Our results suggest that if the measure of quality is time to the hospital,
ambulances that are part of fire departments seem to provide the highest quality of
service, although the difference likely results from ambulances being collocated with
fire trucks, which may not be the most efficient option. Other than this difference,
we find very little difference in quality among other ownership structures. Based
on our admittedly crude measures of cost differences, we do not see much difference
in the costs of operating an ambulance service across ownership types. Finally, our
care at the scene that would negate the need to travel to a hospital.
18As an example of local governments unwillingness to collect from patients who owe for ambulance
services, see the Lexington Herold Leader (Estep, 2017b) for a story about Clay County, Kentucky,
one of the poorest counties in the country. It has accumulated over $1.9 million in unpaid bills for
ambulance services. Also, the New York Times article (Ivory et al., 2016) suggests that in some
instances, private-sector companies provide lower-quality services than other ambulance services.
Our results suggest that this difference is not systematicat least using transport time for the measure
of quality.
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discussion of other factors to consider when thinking about the most efficient form
of ambulance services tends to slightly favor private-sector ambulances, but this
advantage remains highly speculative. In the end, like many early efforts to explore an
important question, the main result from this study is to highlight important issues
that need to be addressed before we can reach a definitive conclusion.
However, one conclusion we are comfortable drawing is that increasing
the availability of more complete data on this industry is important. Medicare
alone reimbursed $5.2 billion in 2012 for ambulance services (GAO, 2012). Federal
Interagency Committee on Emergency Medical Services (2012) report that in 2011,
over 13,000 emergency services employed over 826,000 people to provide transport to
patients, which represents a significant expenditure of taxpayer dollars. Therefore,
it seems worth expending additional resources to obtain data on patient outcomes
and other measures of quality of services, as well as to collect more complete data
on costs, so that policymakers can make more informed decisions on the best way to
provide ambulance services in a community.
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4.8 Tables
Table 4.1: Percent of Ambulance Trips by Orga-
nizational Type
Organizational Type Percent of all trips
Fire Department 26.4
Government 21.1
Private, Nonhospital 21.1
Community, Nonprofit 14.8
Hospital 16.6
Source: NEMSIS data for 201015. Note: Sample size is
56,057,075.
Table 4.2: Percent of EMS Agencies by Organiza-
tional Type
Organizational Type Percent of all agencies
Fire Department 41.4
Private, Nonhospital 25.3
Government 21.1
Other EMS Agency 6.3
Hospital 5.8
Source: Federal Interagency Committee on Emergency Medi-
cal Services (2012). Note: Data are missing for CA, IL, VA,
and WA.
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean/Percent Standard Deviation
Dependent variables:
Ln Total Response Time 3.57 0.4
Ln Time to Scene 1.95 0.61
Ln Scene Time 2.59 0.57
Ln Transport Time 2.43 0.72
Total Response Time 38.28 15.89
Time to Scene 8.43 5.62
Scene Time 15.43 8.16
Transport Time 14.42 10.44
Independent variables:
Patient characteristics
Gender (%)
Male 45.64
Female 54.36
Age 55.07 23.87
Age (1-17) 6.21
Age (18-64) 54.9
Age (65 and older) 38.87
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics continued
Variable Mean/Percent Standard Deviation
Agency characteristics
Ownership type (%)
Community, Nonprofit 14.84
Fire Department 26.37
Government 21.14
Hospital 16.6
Private, Nonhospital 21.05
Staff medical status (%)
EMT-Basic 8.45
EMT-Intermediate 1.11
EMT-Paramedic 85.77
Nurse 3.39
Physician 1.12
First Responder 0.17
Staff composition (%)
Mixed 19.27
Nonvolunteer 78.01
Volunteer 2.72
CMS Service Level (%)
BLS 19.34
BLS Emergency 44.77
ALS Level 1 3.15
ALS Level 1 Emergency 6.72
ALS Level 2 26.02
Note: Sample size is 29,932,888.
Table 4.5: Summary Statistics continued
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Census Division (%)
New England 9.46
Middle Atlantic 2.58
East North Central 25.25
West North Central 3.54
South Atlantic 3.59
East South Central 5.33
West South Central 41.14
Mountain 5.57
Pacific 3.53
Urban (%)
Rural/Wilderness 9.99
Urban/Suburban 90.01
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Table 4.6: Main Results
Variables Ln Total
Response
Time
Ln Time to
Scene
Ln Scene
Time
Ln Trans-
port Time
Ownership (“Community Nonprofit” is omitted category)
Fire Department -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.08*** -0.27***
(0.025) (0.042) (0.016) (0.043)
Government Non Fire -0.05 0.02 -0.05*** -0.07
(0.017) (0.030) (0.012) (0.033)
Hospital -0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.17
(0.017) (0.030) (0.048) (0.060)
Private Non Hospital -0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.15***
(0.033) (0.040) (0.021) (0.041)
Ownership X Rural
Community Nonprofit X Rural 0.01 0.09 -0.04 -0.08***
(0.025) (0.044) (0.019) (0.023)
Fire Department X Rural -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.1
(0.068) (0.089) (0.024) (0.116)
Government Non Fire X Rural 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.03 0.13
(0.011) (0.025) (0.019) (0.043)
Hospital X Rural -0.02 0.05 -0.14 -0.02
(0.029) (0.033) (0.050) (0.087)
Private Non Hospital X Rural 0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.01
(0.045) (0.041) (0.022) (0.093)
CMS Service level (“BLS” is the Omitted Category)
BLS Emergency -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
(0.013) (0.028) (0.027) (0.033)
ALS level 1 0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.02
(0.047) (0.018) (0.097) (0.028)
ALS Level 1 Emergency -0.12*** 0.02 -0.23*** -0.12***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.023) (0.015)
ALS Level 2 -0.13*** -0.01 -0.22*** -0.14***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.025)
Staff Medical Status (“EMT Basic” is the Omitted Category)
Staff:EMT Intermediate 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.12
(0.066) (0.089) (0.047) (0.111)
Staff:EMT Paramed 0.08 0.09 0.11*** 0.07
(0.068) (0.076) (0.030) (0.107)
Staff:Nurse 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.07
(0.061) (0.098) (0.027) (0.105)
Staff:Physician 0.09 0.18 0.15*** 0.02
(0.067) (0.083) (0.020) (0.102)
First responder -0.38*** -0.52*** 0.1 -0.93***
(0.074) (0.085) (0.041) (0.103)
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. These are corrected for
clustering within Census division. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 4.7: Main Results continued
Variables Ln Total
Response
Time
Ln Time to
Scene
Ln Scene
Time
Ln Trans-
port Time
Staff Composition (“Mixed” is the Omitted Category)
Non-volunteer -0.05*** -0.05 0.01 -0.13***
(0.014) (0.032) (0.020) (0.031)
Volunteer 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.12 0.22***
(0.024) (0.031) (0.037) (0.037)
Patient gender (“Male” is omitted category)
Female 0.01*** 0 0.03*** 0.01
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Patient Age 0.00*** 0 0.01*** 0
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year Effects (“2010” is the Omitted Category)
Year=2011 0.01 0 0 0.02
(0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017)
Year=2012 0.01 0 0 0.03
(0.014) (0.007) (0.016) (0.023)
Year=2013 0.01 0.01 0 0.03
(0.015) (0.007) (0.018) (0.024)
Year=2014 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06
(0.026) (0.011) (0.037) (0.032)
Year=2015 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.07*
(0.027) (0.014) (0.039) (0.030)
Census Division effects (“New England” is the Omitted Category)
Middle Atlantic 0.07*** 0.22*** -0.14*** 0.21***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.008) (0.032)
East North Central 0 0.04 0 -0.04
(0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.030)
West North Central 0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.08***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011)
South Atlantic -0.07*** -0.01 -0.09*** -0.08***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
East South Central 0.03*** 0.02 -0.13*** 0.20***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
West South Central 0.06*** 0.15*** -0.06*** 0.13***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017)
Mountain 0 0.03 -0.07*** 0.06***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.015)
Pacific 0.03*** 0.07*** -0.02*** 0.06***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012)
Constant 3.50*** 1.80*** 2.34*** 2.59***
(0.092) (0.080) (0.056) (0.119)
R-squared 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.05
Observations 29,932,888 29,932,888 29,932,888 29,932,888
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. These are corrected
for clustering within Census division. *** denotes statistical significance at the
1% level.
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Table 4.8: Percent of Ambulance Calls by Ambulance Service Characteristics
and Ownership Type
Community Fire Government Hospital Private
Nonprofit Department Nonhospital
Staff Medical Status
EMT-Basic 25.12 6.07 5.72 5.95 4.39
EMT-
Intermediate
2.17 0.89 1.02 0.48 1.22
EMT-
Paramedic
67.8 88.86 89.75 87.17 89.46
Nurse 3.91 2.3 0.84 6.18 4.73
Physician 0.03 1.82 2.63 0.22 0.2
First Responder 0.97 0.06 0.03 0 0
Staff Composition
Mixed 40.89 30.25 12.38 5.13 8.33
Nonvolunteer 48.06 66.93 86.76 94.78 91
Volunteer 11.05 2.82 0.86 0.09 0.67
CMS Service Level
BLS 4.78 29.68 14.19 3.73 34.13
BLS, Emer-
gency
52.73 35.16 52.39 51.34 38.35
ALS, Level 1 1.73 2.86 3.04 2.15 5.42
ALS, Level 1
Emergency
5.59 10.61 5.79 2.07 7.24
ALS, Level 2 35.18 21.69 24.59 40.71 14.86
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4.9 Figures
Figure 4.1: Years States Started Reporting to NEMSIS.
Note: Data collected from various PowerPoint presentations made by NEMSIS staff.
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Figure 4.2: Definitions of Staff Medical Status.
Source: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2007).
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Figure 4.3: Definition of CMS Service Levels
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Appendix
The following are the descriptions for the tables from American Community
Survey that are obtained from the American Fact Finder tool from the website of US
Census Bureau. These tables have been used to extract the county characteristics
data needed for Chapter 3:
B02001: Estimates for race: White alone, Black or African American
alone, American Indian and Alaska Native alone, Asian alone, and Native
Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone and estimates for total county
population. The ACS defines “race alone” as including “people who
reported a single entry (i.e., Korean) and no other race, as well as people
who reported two or more entries within the same major race group (i.e.,
Asian). For example, respondents who reported Korean and Vietnamese
are part of the larger Asian alone race group.”19
B03003: Estimates for Hispanic or Latino origin. For 2008, the informa-
tion on percentage of population that is Hispanic that was recorded in
tables B3001 and B3002 for different counties were merged to form one
file with all the counties that had the information. From 2009 on, there is
just one table (B3003) that contained the information on percentage of
people that are Hispanic and those that are not.
B11001: Estimates for total Households and total family households.
DP02: Estimate for total population that were Foreign born (by place of
birth).
DP03: Estimate for total population 16 years and over employed in labor
force (Civilian labor force employed), workers 16 years and over commuting
(carpooling) by car, truck, or van, workers 16 years and over commuting
by public transportation (excluding taxicab), and Civilian labor force
employed population 16 years and over employed in manufacturing.
19For more information, see https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/
subject_definitions/2016_ACSSubjectDefinitions.pdf.
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DP04: Estimates for total housing units, occupied housing units, vacant
housing units, homeowner vacancy rate, rental vacancy rate, and median
value of owner-occupied units.
S1501: Estimate for total population 25 years and over and for population
25 years and over with Bachelor’s degree.
S1701: Estimate for percent of population below poverty level.
S1901: Estimate for Median household income
S1903: Estimate of total families with own children under 18 years.
S2301: Estimate for unemployment rate for population 16 years and over.
S2502: Estimate for occupied housing units and renter-occupied housing
units.
Variable Construction
(1) Percentage of nonwhite population= Percent of White alone population+ percent
of Black or African American alone population+ percent of American Indian and
Alaska Native alone population+ Asian alone + percent of Native Hawaiian and Other
Pacific Islander alone population.
(2) Percent of population 25 years and over with Bachelor’s degree= Population 25
years and over with Bachelor’s degree/ Total population 25 years and over.
(3) Percent of family households with own children under 18= families with own
children under 18/ total family households.
(4) Percent of renter occupied housing= renter-occupied housing units/ total occupied
housing units.
(5) Percent of civilian labor force commuting by car, truck, or van = civilian labor
force commuting by car, truck, or van/total civilian labor force.
(6) Percent of civilian labor force commuting by public transportation (excluding
taxicab)= civilian labor force commuting by public transportation (excluding taxi-
cab)/total employed civilian labor force.
(7) Percent of population that is foreign born (by place of birth)= population that is
foreign born (by place of birth)/total population.
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(8) Percent of civilian labor force employed in manufacturing= civilian labor force
employed in manufacturing/ total employed civilian labor force.
(9) Percent occupied housing= occupied housing units/total housing units.
(10) Propensity to action = Percent of civilian labor force commuting by car, truck, or
van+ Percent of civilian labor force commuting by public transportation (excluding
taxicab)+ Percent of renter occupied housing+ Percent of family households with own
children under 18+ Percent of population 25 years and over with Bachelor’s degree+
Percent of civilian labor force employed in manufacturing.
ACS variable definitions by the US Census Bureau
The following are the detailed definitions for county characteristics (used in
the main regression analysis in Chapter 3) directly from the American Community
Survey (ACS) 2016 documentation on subject definitions.20
Race
The data on race were derived from answers to the question on race that was asked
of all people (Question 6 in the 2016 American Community Survey (ACS)). The
U.S. Census Bureau collects race data in accordance with guidelines provided by
the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and these data are based on
self-identification. The racial categories included in the census questionnaire generally
reflect a social definition of race recognized in this country and not an attempt to
define race biologically, anthropologically, or genetically. In addition, it is recognized
that the categories of the race item include racial and national origin or sociocultural
groups. People may choose to report more than one race to indicate their racial
mixture, such as “American Indian” and “White.”
People who identify their origin as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish may be
of any race. The racial classifications used by the Census Bureau adhere to the
October 30, 1997, Federal Register notice entitled, Revisions to the Standards for the
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity issued by OMB. These standards
govern the categories used to collect and present federal data on race and ethnicity.
OMB requires five minimum categories (White, Black or African American, American
Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, and Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander) for
20This document is publicly available from US Census Bureau at https://www2.census.gov/
programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/subject_definitions/2016_ACSSubjectDefinitions.pdf.
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race. The race categories are described below with a sixth category, Some Other Race,
added with OMB approval. In addition to the five race groups, OMB also states
that respondents should be offered the option of selecting one or more races. If an
individual did not provide a race response, the race or races of the householder or
other household members were imputed using specific rules of precedence of household
relationship. For example, if race was missing for a natural-born child in the household,
then either the race or races of the householder, another natural-born child, or spouse
of the householder were imputed. If race was not reported for anyone in the household,
then the race or races of a householder in a previously processed household were
imputed.
Definitions from OMB guide the Census Bureau in classifying written responses to
the race question:
White. A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle
East, or North Africa. It includes people who indicate their race as “White” or report
entries such as Irish, German, Italian, Lebanese, Arab, Moroccan, or Caucasian.
Black or African American. A person having origins in any of the Black racial
groups of Africa. It includes people who indicate their race as “Black or African Am.”
or report entries such as African American, Kenyan, Nigerian, or Haitian.
American Indian or Alaska Native. A person having origins in any of the original
peoples of North and South America (including Central America) and who maintains
tribal affiliation or community attachment. This category includes people who indicate
their race as American Indian or Alaska Native or report entries such as Navajo,
Blackfeet, Inupiat, Yupik, or Central American Indian groups, or South American
Indian groups. Respondents who identified themselves as American Indian or Alaska
Native were asked to report their enrolled or principal tribe. Therefore, tribal data
in tabulations reflect the written entries reported on the questionnaires. Some of
the entries (for example, Metlakatla Indian Community and Umatilla) represent
reservations or a confederation of tribes on a reservation. The information on tribe is
based on self-identification and, therefore, does not reflect any designation of federally
or state-recognized tribe. The information for the 2016 ACS Detailed Race tables were
derived from the American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Classification List for the
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2010 Census, which was updated through 2009 based on the annual Federal Register
notice entitled Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, issued by OMB, and through consultation with American Indian and Alaska
Native communities and leaders. The American Indian categories shown in the 2016
ACS Detailed Race tables represent tribal groupings, which refer to the combining
of individual American Indian tribes, such as Fort Sill Apache, Mescalero Apache,
and San Carlos Apache, into the general Apache tribal grouping. The Alaska Native
categories shown in the 2016 ACS Detailed Race tables represent tribal groupings,
which refer to the combining of individual Alaska Native tribes, such as King Salmon
Tribe, Native Village of Kanatak, and Sunaq Tribe of Kodiak, into the general Aleut
tribal grouping.
All Other American Indian Tribes (with only one tribe reported).
Includes respondents who provide a response of another American Indian
tribe not shown separately, such as Abenaki, Catawba, Eastern Tribes,
Kickapoo, Mattaponi, Quapaw, Shawnee, or Yuchi.
American Indian Tribes, not specified. Includes people who provide
a generic term such as American Indian or tribal groupings not elsewhere
classified.
Alaska Native Tribes, not specified. Includes people who provide a
generic term such as “Alaska Indian” or “Alaska Native” or tribal groupings
not elsewhere classified.
American Indian Tribes or Alaska Native Tribes, not specified.
Includes respondents who checked the American Indian or Alaska Native
response category on the ACS questionnaire and did not write in a specific
group or wrote in a generic term such as “American Indian or Alaska
Native.”
Asian. A person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast
Asia, or the Indian subcontinent including, for example, Cambodia, China, India,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam. It
includes people who indicate their race as Asian Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Korean,
Japanese, Vietnamese, and Other Asian or provide other detailed Asian responses.
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Asian Indian. Includes respondents who indicate their race as Asian
Indian or report entries such as India or East Indian.
Bangladeshi. Includes respondents who report entries such as Bangladeshi
or Bangladesh.
Bhutanese. Includes respondents who report entries such as Bhutanese
or Bhutan. Burmese. Includes respondents who report entries such as
Burmese or Burma.
Cambodian. Includes respondents who report entries such as Cambodian
or Cambodia. Chinese, except Taiwanese. Includes respondents who
indicate their race as Chinese or report entries such as China or Chinese
American.
Filipino. Includes respondents who indicate their race as Filipino or
report entries such as Philippines or Filipino American.
Hmong. Includes respondents who report entries such as Hmong or Mong.
Indonesian. Includes respondents who report entries such as Indonesian
or Indonesia. Japanese. Includes respondents who indicate their race as
Japanese or report entries such as Japan or Japanese American.
Korean. Includes respondents who indicate their race as Korean or report
entries such as Korea or Korean American.
Laotian. Includes respondents who report entries such as Laotian or Laos.
Malaysian. Includes respondents who report entries such as Malaysian or
Malaysia.
Mongolian. Includes respondents who report entries such as Mongolian,
Mongolia or Mongol.
Nepalese. Includes respondents who report entries such as Nepalese or
Nepal.
Okinawan. Includes respondents who report entries such as Okinawan or
Okinawa.
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Pakistani. Includes respondents who report entries such as Pakistani or
Pakistan.
Sri Lankan. Includes respondents who report entries such as Sri Lankan
or Sri Lanka.
Taiwanese. Includes respondents who report entries such as Taiwanese
or Taiwan.
Thai. Includes respondents who report entries such as Thai or Thailand.
Vietnamese. Includes respondents who indicate their race as Vietnamese
or report entries such as Vietnam or Vietnamese American.
Other Asian, specified. Includes respondents who provide a response of
another Asian group not shown separately, such as Iwo Jiman, Maldivian,
or Singaporean.
Other Asian, not specified. Includes respondents who checked the
“Other Asian” response category on the ACS questionnaire and did not
write in a specific group or wrote in a generic term such as “Asian,” or
“Asiatic.”
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander. A person having origins in any of
the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, or other Pacific Islands. It includes
people who indicate their race as Native Hawaiian, Guamanian or Chamorro, Samoan,
and Other Pacific Islander or provide other detailed Pacific Islander responses.
Native Hawaiian. Includes respondents who indicate their race as Native
Hawaiian or report entries such as Part Hawaiian or Hawaiian.
Samoan. Includes respondents who indicate their race as Samoan or
report entries such as American Samoan or Western Samoan.
Tongan. Includes respondents who report entries such as Tongan or
Tonga.
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Other Polynesian. Includes respondents who provide a response of
another Polynesian group, such as Tahitian, Tokelauan, or wrote in a
generic term such as “Polynesian.” Guamanian or Chamorro. Includes
respondents who indicate their race as “Guamanian or Chamorro” or
report entries such as Chamorro or Guam.
Marshallese. Includes respondents who report entries such as Marshallese
or Marshall Islands. Other Micronesian. Includes respondents who provide
a response of another Micronesian group, such as Carolinian, Chuukese,
I-Kiribati, Kosraean, Mariana Islander, Palauan, Pohnpeian, Saipanese,
Yapese, or wrote in a generic term such as “Micronesian.” Fijian. Includes
respondents who report entries such as Fijian or Fiji.
Other Melanesian. Includes respondents who provide a response of
another Melanesian group, such as Papua New Guinean, Ni-Vanuatu (New
Hebrides Islander), Solomon Islander, or wrote in a generic term such as
“Melanesian.”
Other Pacific Islander, not specified. Includes respondents who
checked the Other Pacific Islander response category on the ACS question-
naire and did not write in a specific group or wrote in a generic term such
as “Pacific Islander.”
Some Other Race. Includes all other responses not included in the “White,” “Black
or African American,” “American Indian or Alaska Native,” “Asian,” and “Native
Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander” race categories described above. Respondents
reporting entries such as multiracial, mixed, interracial, or a Hispanic, Latino, or
Spanish group (for example, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or Spanish) in response
to the race question are included in this category.
Two or More Races. People may choose to provide two or more races either by
checking two or more race response check boxes, by providing multiple responses, or
by some combination of check boxes and other responses. The race response categories
shown on the questionnaire are collapsed into the five minimum race groups identified
by OMB, and the Census Bureaus “Some Other Race” category. For data product
purposes, “Two or More Races” refers to combinations of two or more of the following
race categories:
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1. White
2. Black or African American
3. American Indian or Alaska Native
4. Asian
5. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
6. Some Other Race
Hispanic or Latino Origin
The data on the Hispanic or Latino population were derived from answers to a question
that was asked of all people (Question 5 in the 2016 American Community Survey
(ACS)). The terms “Hispanic,” “Latino,” and “Spanish” are used interchangeably.
Some respondents identify with all three terms while others may identify with only
one of these three specific terms. Hispanics or Latinos who identify with the terms
“Hispanic,” “Latino,” or “Spanish” are those who classify themselves in one or more
of the specific Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish categories listed on the questionnaire
(“Mexican,” “Puerto Rican,” or “Cuban”) as well as those who indicate that they are
“another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin.” People who do not identify with any
of the specific origins listed on the questionnaire but indicate that they are “another
Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin” are those who identify as Argentinian, Colombian,
Dominican, Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, Spaniard, or other Spanish cultures or origins. Up
to two write-in responses to the another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin category
are coded. Origin can be viewed as the heritage, nationality group, lineage, or country
of birth of the person or the persons parents or ancestors before their arrival in the
United States. People who identify their origin as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish may
be of any race. Hispanic origin is used in numerous programs and is vital in making
policy decisions. These data are needed to determine compliance with provisions of
antidiscrimination in employment and minority recruitment legislation. Under the
Voting Rights Act, data about Hispanic origin are essential to ensure enforcement of
bilingual election rules.
Hispanic origin classifications used by the Census Bureau and other federal
agencies meet the requirements of standards issued by the Office of Management and
Budget in 1997 (Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on
Race and Ethnicity). These standards set forth guidance for statistical collection and
reporting on race and ethnicity used by all federal agencies. Some tabulations are
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shown by the origin of the householder. In all cases where the origin of households,
families, or occupied housing units is classified as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish, the
origin of the householder is used.
Income in the Past 12 Months
The data on income were derived from answers to Questions 47 and 48 in the 2016
American Community Survey (ACS), which were asked of the population 15 years old
and over. Total income is the sum of the amounts reported separately for wage or
salary income; net self-employment income; interest, dividends, or net rental or royalty
income or income from estates and trusts; Social Security or Railroad Retirement
income; Supplemental Security Income (SSI); public assistance or welfare payments;
retirement, survivor, or disability pensions; and all other income. 82 Receipts from
the following sources are not included as income: capital gains, money received from
the sale of property (unless the recipient was engaged in the business of selling such
property); the value of income in kind from food stamps, public housing subsidies,
medical care, employer contributions for individuals, etc.; withdrawal of bank deposits;
money borrowed; tax refunds; exchange of money between relatives living in the same
household; gifts and lump-sum inheritances, insurance payments, and other types of
lumpsum receipts.
Income is a vital measure of general economic circumstances. Income data
are used to determine poverty status, to measure economic well-being, and to assess
the need for assistance. These data are included in federal allocation formulas for
many government programs. For instance:
Social Services: Under the Older Americans Act, funds for food, health care, and
legal services are distributed to local agencies based on data about elderly people with
low incomes. Data about income at the state and county levels are used to allocate
funds for food, health care, and classes in meal planning to low-income women with
children.
Employment: Income data are used to identify local areas eligible for grants to
stimulate economic recovery, run job-training programs, and define areas such as
empowerment or enterprise zones.
Housing: Under the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program, income data
are used to allocate funds to areas for home energy aid. Under the Community Devel-
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opment Block Grant Program, funding for housing assistance and other community
development is based on income and other census data.
Education: Data about poor children are used to allocate funds to counties and
school districts. These funds provide resources and services to improve the education
of economically disadvantaged children. In household surveys, respondents tend to
underreport income. Asking the list of specific sources of income helps respondents
remember all income amounts that have been received, and asking total income
increases the overall response rate and thus, the accuracy of the answers to the income
questions. The eight specific sources of income also provide needed detail about items
such as earnings, retirement income, and public assistance.
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